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Investors as International Law Intermediaries: Using
Shareholder Proposals to Enforce Human Rights
Kishanthi Parella*
ABSTRACT
One of the biggest challenges with international law remains its
enforcement. This challenge grows when it comes to enforcing
international law norms against corporations and other business
organizations. The United Nations Guiding Principles recognizes the
“corporate responsibility to respect human rights,” which includes human
rights due diligence practices that are adequate for “assessing actual and
potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings,
tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.”
Unfortunately, many corporations around the world are failing to
implement adequate human rights due diligence practices in their supply
chains. This inattention leads to significant harms for the victims of these
human rights abuses and a variety of risks – legal, reputational, business,
and regulatory – for the companies involved. Over the years, lawsuits have
been brought against Walmart, JC Penney, Hershey, Nestle, Purina, Tesla,
Google, Chevron, and many others regarding their human rights practices.
As part of Berle XII’s exploration of “Corporate Capitalism and the
City of God,” this Article explores how shareholders have attempted to
change the human rights due diligence practices of companies by
submitting shareholder proposals requesting information on a company’s
human rights policies, assessments, and implementation strategies. While
many of these proposals are filed by faith based organizations and other
members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR),
recent proposals have also received support from actors such as
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Comparative Law, Duke Law School; M. Phil. in International Relations, University of Cambridge.
Many thanks to feedback received at the Berle XII Symposium “Corporate Capitalism and the City of
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BlackRock and Vanguard. This Article provides a descriptive account of
the proposals submitted, evaluates the various shareholder reasons for
proposing and supporting these proposals, discusses the outcomes of these
proposals (such as approval, exclusion, and withdrawal), and analyzes the
possibilities and limitations of enforcing international human rights norms
through the mechanism of shareholder proposals.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)—a recognition of
fundamental human rights that should be protected around the world.1 The
UDHR was subsequently followed by human rights treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); Convention on the

1. See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), among others.2
While these agreements were created with government actors in
mind, corporations and other business organizations are also frequently
implicated in human rights violations. For example, these actors have been
accused of human rights violations ranging from forced labor, worst forms
of child labor, human trafficking, and facilitating the commission of
international crimes. As explained by the former United Nations Special
Representative on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie, the
challenge is that “[t]he international community is still in the early stages
of adapting the human rights regime to provide more effective protection
to individuals and communities against corporate-related human rights
harm.”3
One way to address corporate conduct contributing to human rights
violations is by harnessing the power of state actors. Governments can use
their regulatory powers to bind companies to honor human rights norms
and hold them accountable when they violate them. The problem is that
many governments fail to act. In some circumstances, those governments
may not have signed or ratified the relevant international human rights
agreements. In other circumstances, governments may be unwilling or
unable to regulate the activity of companies doing business in their
territories in accordance with the human rights agreements that they
joined. These are some of the reasons why there are significant roadblocks
to using the government pathway to encourage corporate compliance with
international human rights.4
But there is another pathway that is increasingly used: Companies
are voluntarily respecting the human rights principles recognized in these
agreements, even when their own governments do not force them to do so.
In some circumstances, companies may even commit to human rights
agreements that their governments refuse to sign or ratify.5 For example,
while the United States is not a party to a number of human rights treaties,
many American companies have committed to those same treaties in their
company policies, statements, supplier codes, and other company
practices.6
2. The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies, UNITED
NATIONS OFF. OF THE HUM. RTS. COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cor
einstruments.aspx [https://perma.cc/P3VJ-5GQQ].
3. JOHN RUGGIE, HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY: A FRAMEWORK FOR
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2008).
4. See generally Kish Parella, International Law in the Boardroom, 108 CORNELL LAW REVIEW
(Forthcoming 2023).
5. See generally id.
6. See infra notes 79–87.
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Why might companies do this when they are not compelled to do so
by government actors? One explanation may be that consumers and
investors pay attention to human rights issues and they express concerns
when companies do not comply with human rights norms.
The problem is that companies may not always live up to their human
rights commitments. Many of the companies that have adopted a human
rights policy are defendants in lawsuits alleging that these same companies
committed grievous human rights violations. For example, Apple’s human
rights policy states: “[We are] deeply committed to respecting
internationally recognized human rights in our business operations, as set
out in the United Nations International Bill of Human Rights and the
International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work.”7 However, media reports suggest that
Apple adopted this new policy following recent criticism of violations in
its supply chain.8 Apple was also sued for facilitating the worst forms of
child labor.9
The example of Apple illustrates the gap between corporate rhetoric,
expressed in various commitments to human rights, and corporate
practice that ignore those commitments and instead continues to
perpetuate violations of human rights. This is particularly a problem when
companies commit to human rights to appease consumers or investors
because that commitment is instrumental for achieving other objectives;
once those objectives are achieved, that commitment may wane.
But these same consumers and investors may be the key to ensuring
that corporate actors comply with their commitments. Specifically, if
corporate actors are committing to human rights norms in order to appease
them, then consumers and investors may be able to similarly incentivize
corporate actors to abide by those commitments. The incentive to comply
is not supplied directly by government actors, but by these various types
of groups whose favor the corporation needs to survive and thrive.

7. Our Commitment to Human Rights, APPLE 3 (2020), https://s2.q4cdn.com/470004039/files/d
oc_downloads/gov_docs/Apple-Human-Rights-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA3V-47BS]
(hereinafter Our Commitment).
8. Rong Shi, Apple Announces ‘Human Rights Policy’ Following Criticism, VOA (Sept. 10,
2020), https://www.voanews.com/economy-business/apple-announces-human-rights-policyfollowing-criticism [https://perma.cc/3K8N-6XNG]; see also Jason Murdock, Apple: Human Rights
Violations in Supply Chain Double in a Year, Report Reveals, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/apple-human-rights-violations-supply-chain-double-year-reportsreveals-836247 [https://perma.cc/8Q4Z-7W3J ].
9. See Class Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v. Apple Inc., No. 1:19-cv03737 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2019).
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This Article examines how shareholders use their unique rights under
Rule 14a-8 to enforce human rights norms.10 Specifically, shareholders
attempt to hold companies accountable to their commitments by
submitting shareholder proposals that they seek to include in the
company’s proxy statement.11 By doing so, the shareholder proponents are
able to draw the attention of both their fellow shareholders and
management to the human rights practices of the company. Specifically,
these proposals often reference a company’s stated human rights policies
and request information on the implementation of the same, including
methods for evaluating effectiveness; their human rights impact
assessments; and other components of their human rights due diligence
process.12 Some shareholder proposals have even requested that the board
nominate a director with expertise in human rights and/or civil rights.13
These proposals attempt to shame companies for the gap between
their rhetoric and their practices by referencing a company’s own
commitments and that company’s conduct that diverges from those
commitments. These proposals also highlight the various risks to the
company created by this gap, and some proposals go so far as to shame
companies by pointing out superior human rights practices of their peer
companies.14 By doing so, shareholders are supplying an enforcement
mechanism for international human rights norms that is private,
decentralized, and uniquely suited to target corporate conduct. By using

10. See generally Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020) [hereinafter SEC
Shareholder Proposals Rule].
11. See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals
as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 365
(2006); Erika George, Shareholder Activism and Stakeholder Engagement Strategies: Promoting
Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and Sustainable Development Goals, 36 WIS. INT’L L.J. 298
(2019); Erika George, Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Media Corporations: Incorporating
Human Rights Through Rankings, Self-Regulation and Shareholder Resolutions, 28 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 521, 535–538 (2018) [hereinafter Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Media
Corporations]; Jennifer Goodman, Céline Louche, Katinka C. van Cranenburgh & Daniel Arenas,
Social Shareholder Engagement: The Dynamics of Voice and Exit, 125 J. BUS. ETHICS 193 (2014);
Emma Sjöström, Shareholder Activism For Corporate Social Responsibility: What Do We Know?, 16
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 141 (2008); Marcia Narine, Disclosing Disclosure’s Effects: Addressing
Corporate Irresponsibility for Human Rights Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 84 (2015);
Rachel Ganson, Shareholder Proposals on HR Compliance (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); Robert McCorquodale, Lise Smit, Stuart Neely & Robin Brooks, Human Rights Due
Diligence in Law and Practice: Good Practices and Challenges for Business Enterprises, 2 BUS. HUM.
RTS. J. 195 (2017). See also Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 224
(2018); Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial
Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Twitter, Inc., 2021 Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2021)
https://sec.report/Document/0001140361-21-012582 [https://perma.cc/D3PC-QXUA].
14. See notes 212–213, infra, and accompanying text.

46

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:41

the shareholder proposal mechanism, shareholders are serving as direct
pathways for international law enforcement.
While these are reasons for optimism, there are also corresponding
reasons for caution. First, not all shareholder proposals share the same fate.
Some shareholder proposals are supported by the majority of shareholder
votes while others are not. Some proposals are opposed by management
and others are not. Many others are withdrawn by the shareholder who
submitted the proposal, sometimes in exchange for an agreement by
company management to make certain changes. Still, others are excluded
based on exceptions outlined in Rule 14a-8.15 These various outcomes
caution against putting too much faith in this particular shareholder
mechanism for encouraging corporate compliance with human rights.
However, it is also important to acknowledge positive signs of shareholder
support for human rights. For example, proxy advisory firm Glass Lewis
has observed that, on average, human rights shareholder proposals are
securing greater shareholder support compared to years past.16
Second, it is important to keep in mind which shareholders are
supporting human rights proposals and their reasons for doing so;
understanding these factors can help human rights advocates better predict
when shareholder proposals may garner significant support and when they
may not. The encouraging news is that while many of the shareholder
proponents are faith-based organizations, human rights proposals are
gaining support from non-faith-based organizations as well. In its 2020
report, Glass Lewis noted that while human rights shareholder proposals
had historically received low levels of shareholder support, those trends
have started to change in the past couple of years “due to the improved
construction and targeting of these proposals.”17 Specifically, in 2019 and
2020, “many of the proposals were asking for broader, more applicable
reporting at companies that had faced controversy on account of their
operations or their industry.”18
For example, both BlackRock and Vanguard supported a 2021
human rights shareholder proposal at Tyson Foods that requested that the
board prepare a report on “Tyson’s human rights due diligence process to
assess, identify, prevent, mitigate, and remedy actual and potential human
rights impacts.”19 A similar proposal at Wendy’s requested a report
“addressing Wendy’s Supplier Code of Conduct and the extent to which
15. See SEC Shareholder Proposals Rule, supra note 10.
16. COURTENEY KEATINGE, MAX DARROW, KATELYN ROTH, KATE FLANAGAN & DIMITRI
ZAGOROFF, GLASS LEWIS, 2020 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 32 (2020).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Tyson Foods, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://sec.report/Document/0000100493-20-000207/ [https://perma.cc/FN3L-PSK6].
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Wendy’s Quality Assurance audits and third-party reviews effectively
protect workers in its food supply chain from human rights violations,
including harms associated with COVID-19.”20 This proposal was
approved by an overwhelming majority of shareholders.21
But it is equally important to acknowledge the different reasons why
shareholders may support these proposals. While faith-based shareholder
proponents may bring these proposals out of humanitarian concerns, these
proposals often highlight the risks that human rights violations create for
the company. For example, a number of shareholder proposals reference
lawsuits or regulatory fines against companies that have drawn negative
publicity to the company. In addition to reputational risks, human rights
violations also create the possibility of legal, regulatory, and business
interruption risks for the companies involved. This convergence of
interests may identify the limiting principle to human rights enforcement
through shareholder proposals. Specifically, shareholder proposals may be
an effective mechanism for encouraging corporate human rights
compliance when there is common interest between various shareholders,
even when their reasons are not the same.
For example, in its 2021 human rights engagement policy,
BlackRock explained the significant connection between responsible
human rights practices and long-term shareholder value:
Unmanaged potential or actual adverse human rights issues can not
only harm the people directly affected, but also expose companies to
significant legal, regulatory, operational, and reputational risks.
These risks can materialize in a variety of ways, from fines and
litigation to workforce and supply chain disruptions that may damage
a company’s standing with business partners, customers, and
communities. Furthermore, these risks may call into question a
company’s social license to operate – the ability to maintain
operations in a certain location and benefit from the labor, raw
material, or regulatory structures in place – particularly if they
significantly undermine its corporate reputation and purpose.22

20. Wendy’s, 2021 Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://sec.report/Document/0001193125-21-103996 (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
21. ICCR, Shareholders Calling for Human Rights Protections for Essential Food Chain
Workers Prevail at Wendy’s Annual Meeting (May 18, 2021), https://www.iccr.org/shareholderscalling-human-rights-protections-essential-food-chain-workers-prevail-wendys-annual
[https://perma.cc/6QNY-J9YF] (“Today shareholders approved a proposal at Wendy’s asking the
company to disclose evidence of whether its existing policies effectively protect workers in its food
supply chain from human rights violations.”).
22. BLACKROCK, OUR APPROACH TO ENGAGEMENT WITH COMPANIES ON THEIR HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPACTS 2 (2021), https://blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentaryengagement-on-human-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MAN-C9QG].
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BlackRock therefore voted in favor of a proposal at Tyson Foods
relating to human rights impact assessment because it “expect[s]
companies to implement, to the extent appropriate, monitoring processes
(often referred to as due diligence) to identify and mitigate potential
adverse impacts, and provide grievance mechanisms to remediate any
actual adverse impacts”23 and Tyson Foods “has limited disclosure
regarding its supply chain audits.”24
Third, the SEC’s rules and guidance can facilitate or inhibit the
ability of shareholders to enforce human rights norms. While Rule 14a-8
allows eligible proposals to be included in the company’s proxy statement,
it also permits a company to seek exclusion of the proposal on several
grounds.25 Recent Staff Legal Bulletins from the Division of Corporate
Finance have clarified the interpretation of some of these grounds for
exclusion that may influence the number of exclusion requests made and
the success of those requests.26 Additionally, in 2020, the SEC amended
Rule 14a-8’s requirements regarding both eligibility and re-submission of
proposals—changes that can also curtail the ability of shareholders to hold
companies accountable through shareholder proposals.27

23. BLACKROCK,
VOTING
BULLETIN:
TYSON
FOODS,
INC.
2
(2021),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-tyson-foods-feb2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH7P-C2RA] [hereinafter BLACKROCK, VOTING BULLETIN]; see also
BLACKROCK, supra note 22, at 2 (“Recognizing that exposure to human rights - related risks will vary
by company and by industry, we ask that companies report on how they integrate human rights
considerations into their operations and risk management processes, and demonstrate the steps they
are taking to address these issues.”).
24. BLACKROCK, VOTING BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 2.
During our most recent engagement, the company disclosed that an independent third-party
audits approximately 25% of Tyson Foods’ production facilities each year to verify their
adherence to the company’s social compliance program. The results are published in the
company’s sustainability report issued each year. In BIS’ view, the percentage of facilities
subject to a third-party audit represents a very small proportion of the company’s total
operations, limiting shareholders’ full understanding of the company’s approach to human
rights due diligence and its effectiveness. In addition, existing disclosures lack clarity on
whether the company’s suppliers and subcontractors are complying with Tyson Foods’
standards.
Id.
25. See generally SEC Shareholder Proposals Rule, supra note 10.
26. See infra notes 287–292 and accompanying text.
27. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule
(Sept. 23, 2020). These changes have been met with criticism and opposition. See, e.g., Interfaith Ctr.
on Corp. Resp. v. SEC, No. 1:21-cv-01620, (D.D.C. June 15, 2021), ¶ 2 (“The SEC’s recent
amendments to Rule 14a-8 severely impair shareholders’ access to the proposal process. The
amendments dramatically increase the amount of stock a shareholder must own to be eligible to submit
a proposal, including a more than ten-fold increase for investments held for only one year. The
amendments also prohibit shareholders from aggregating their holdings to meet the new requirements.
Those changes will have a disproportionate impact on Main Street investors, for whom the proposal
process is a critical mechanism for raising concern.”) (emphasis omitted).
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Part I explains the various sub-national, national, and international
regulatory strategies developed to improve corporate human rights
practices. Part II discusses how many companies commit to human rights
norms, such as in policies and codes of conduct, but routinely fail to
implement them in a meaningful manner. Part III discusses ways to
overcome the risk of empty rhetoric by explaining how commitments can
serve as entry points for further organizational change. Part IV illustrates
these strategies by discussing recent shareholder proposals that seek to
hold companies accountable for their human rights commitments. Many
of these proposals request that companies conform their practices to the
United Nations Guiding Principles by asking for additional company
disclosures on human rights risks assessments, methods for evaluating
effectiveness of policies, and oversight of human rights issues.28 Part V
concludes by discussing the possibilities and limitations of enforcing
human rights norms through shareholder proposals, including the
possibilities for transplanting foreign or international regulatory design;
developing a broad base of investor support; challenges posed by excluded
proposals; possibilities of withdrawn proposals; and the informationforcing effects (informal disclosure) achieved through company resistance
to shareholder proposals.
I. REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE
It is well understood that a company’s operations can have
significant human rights consequences for, among others, its consumers,
employees, and for the local communities in which it operates. This
recognition has led to a variety of regulatory approaches to address
business and human rights at the sub-national, national, and international
levels. For example, several jurisdictions have mandated reporting
requirements for companies in order to encourage improved human rights
practices. The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act29 requires
covered companies to disclose their efforts to ensure that their supply
chains are free from slavery and human trafficking, including information
about their practices concerning verification, audits, certifications, internal
accountability standards, procedures, and training.30 The law requires that
covered companies publish this information on their website if they have
one.31 Similarly, the UK Modern Slavery Act (MSA)32 requires that
covered companies provide an annual statement of the measures that they
28. See infra Part IV and note 142.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c) (West 2012).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Modern Slavery Act, (2015) 30 CURRENT LAW (Eng.).

50

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:41

take to eradicate slavery from their supply chains.33 Section 54 of the MSA
recommends a number of topics that a statement should include, such as
“its due diligence processes in relation to slavery and human trafficking in
its business and supply chains” and “the parts of its business and supply
chains where there is a risk of slavery and human trafficking taking place,
and the steps it has taken to assess and manage that risk.”34
The problem is that these laws do not establish a floor for practices—
only reporting requirements. Therefore, a company could comply with the
California law, for example, by reporting that it took no actions.35 These
laws also lack institutional features that could harness reputational
mechanisms to drive compliance. For example, they lack a list of
companies required to report, thereby making it difficult to shame noncompliant companies.36 They similarly lack a public database of company
statements that could facilitate comparability among companies and
changes within the same company over time.37
Other countries have taken a different approach and mandated that
companies implement human rights due diligence processes as opposed to
only disclosing their efforts in that regard. For example, the French Duty
of Vigilance Law imposes a general mandatory due diligence requirement
for human rights and environmental impacts, requiring that covered
companies establish, publish, and implement a vigilance plan that must
include: “[a]ppropriate measures to identify, prevent and mitigate risks to
human rights and the environment”;38 “[a] means to assess the situations
of supply chains, subsidiaries or subcontractors in relation to risk
mapping”;39 “[a] collection method for actual and potential risks, and
planned actions to mitigate risks and prevent violations”;40 and
“[m]onitoring to assess the efficiency of implemented measures.”41
33. Virginia Mantouvalou, The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 Three Years On, 81 MOD. L. REV.
1017, 1038 (2018).
34. Id. See also Modern Slavery Act, supra note 32, § 54(5).
35. See, e.g., KAMALA HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN
SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE, (2015), https://advocacy.calchamber.com/wpcontent/uploads/policy/California-Transparency-in-Supply-Chains-Act-Resource-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UE4H-T4MQ].
36. KNOW THE CHAIN, FIVE YEARS OF THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS
ACT 5 (2015).
37. See JOINT STANDING COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFS., DEF. & TRADE, MODERN SLAVERY AND
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS § 2.28 (2017).
38. Regulatory Resource Center, ASSENT, https://www.assentcompliance.com/assentu/resource
s/article/french-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-law/?PF_Corporate_Social_Responsibility__c=true
[https://perma.cc/Y48T-EH8J] (providing a broad overview of the French Corporate Duty of
Vigilance law).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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The Netherlands introduced a law consisting of both reporting and
due diligence requirements concerning child labor, requiring that
companies “investigate whether their goods or services have been
produced utilising child labour and to devise a plan to prevent child labour
in their supply chains if they find it.”42 Critically, the law “applies to all
companies that sell or supply goods or services to Dutch consumers, no
matter where the company is based or registered, with no exemptions for
legal form or size.”43 Additionally, in 2022, the European Commission
shared its proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability due diligence
that “would impose mandatory environmental and human rights due
diligence obligations on companies operating in the European
Union . . . and, if adopted, could have significant implications not only for
EU enterprises but also for US and other non-EU companies conducting
business within the EU.”44
Over the years, the United Nations has attempted to close this
“governance gap” that facilitates human rights abuses by corporations and
other business actors. For example, in 2003, the United Nations SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved
the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” (the
“Norms”).45 The Norms clarified that “[w]ithin their respective spheres of
activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business
enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of,
respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in
international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of
indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.”46 The Norms outlined a
number of obligations of corporations relating to security, equal
opportunity, non-discrimination, and other rights pertaining to the

42. Suzanne Spears & Olga Owczarek, Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Laws: The
Netherlands Led the Way in Addressing Child Labour and Contemplates Broader Action, ALLEN &
OVERY (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-andinsights/publications/mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence-laws-the-netherlands-led-the-way-inaddressing-child-labour-and-contemplates-broader-action [https://perma.cc/6YAA-DR9F].
43. Id.
44. Brent L. Bernell, John J. Gilluly III, Brooke Goodlett, Richard Sterneberg, Jesse Medlong,
Sonakshi Kapoor, Daniel Weinstein & Jack Haimowitz, Proposed EU Corporate Sustainability Due
Diligence Directive: What US Companies Need to Know, DLA PIPER (Mar. 31, 2022),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2022/03/proposed-eu-corporate-sustainabilitydue-diligence-directive/#:~:text=The%20Proposed%20Directive%20would%20impose,
conducting%20business%20within%20the%20EU [https://perma.cc/CK3V-AZ2S].
45. Comm. on Hum. Rts., Subcomm. on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts. On its fiftyfifth session, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
46. Id.
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protection of workers, consumers, and the environment, among other
concerns.47
However, a number of businesses and governments resisted the
Norms. The International Chamber of Commerce and the International
Organization of Employers labeled the Norms as an “extreme case of the
‘privatization of human rights’” because, “[a]mong other things, it shifts
human rights duties from States to civil society actors.”48 The UN
Commission on Human Rights ultimately declined to adopt the Norms,
but it did request the United Nations Secretary General to appoint a Special
Representative on Business and Human Rights (the “Special
Representative”) to provide a report that, among other topics, “identif[ies]
and clarif[ies] standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to
human rights.”49 In 2008, the Special Representative submitted his final
report and proposed a “tripartite framework” that clarified the
responsibilities of both state and business actors in protecting human
rights.50 This framework rested upon three pillars:
• “[T]he State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third
parties, including business;”51
• “[t]he corporate responsibility to respect human rights”52
• “and the need for more effective access to remedies.”53
The report clarified that the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights required due diligence, a “concept [that] describes the steps a
company must take to become aware of, prevent and address adverse
human rights impacts.”54 Specifically, the report recommended that
companies consider the following three factors: (a) “country contexts in
which their business activities take place, to highlight any specific human
rights challenges they may pose”55; (b) “what human rights impacts their
own activities may have within that context - for example, in their capacity
as producers, service providers, employers, and neighbours”56 and (c)
47. See id.
48. Joint Views of the IOE and ICC on the Draft “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights”, INT’L CHAMBER OF
COM. & INT.’L ORG. EMPLY., at 19 (Mar. 2004), [https://perma.cc/4X36-TARD].
49. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, ¶ 1(a).
50. See U.N. Special Rep. on Business and Hum. Rts., Protect, Respect, and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
51. Id. ¶ 9.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. ¶ 56.
55. Id. ¶ 57.
56. Id.
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“whether they might contribute to abuse through the relationships
connected to their activities, such as with business partners, suppliers,
State agencies, and other non-State actors.”57
The UN Human Rights Council adopted the framework and
authorized the Special Representative to operationalize the framework.58
In 2011, the Human Rights Council endorsed the Special Representative’s
proposed Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)—
a set of thirty-one principles that elaborated upon the 2008 framework.59
Together, these principles establish a common baseline of expectations
regarding the role of governments and businesses to protect human rights.
UNGPs 11–24 discuss the specific role of businesses in protecting human
rights.60 UNGP 11 explains that businesses should respect human rights,
which “means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of
others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they
are involved.”61 In terms of substantive content, the UNGPs clarify that
“responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights refers to
internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a minimum, as
those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International
Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work.”62 The commentary to UNGP 12 further explains that the
International Bill of Rights includes:
[The] Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the main
instruments through which it has been codified: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights[], coupled with
the principles concerning fundamental rights in the eight ILO core
conventions as set out in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work. These are the benchmarks against which other
social actors assess the human rights impacts of business
enterprises.63

57. Id.
58. See generally U.N. Hum. Rts. Council Res. 8/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/17/4 (June 17, 2008)
(titled “Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises”).
59. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/17/4 (July 6, 2011) (titled
“Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Enterprises”).
60. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS:
IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT, AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK 13 (2011)
[hereinafter PROTECT, RESPECT, AND REMEDY FRAMEWORK].
61. Id. at 13.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 14.
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The UNGPs also clarify the steps a business should take (or not take)
in order to respect human rights. According to UNGP 13,
[t]he responsibility to respect human rights requires that business
enterprises: (a) [a]void causing or contributing to adverse human
rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts
when they occur; (b) [s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or
services by their business relationships, even if they have not
contributed to those impacts.64

The UNGPs further clarify that, in order to respect human rights, a
business should have in place the following: (a) a policy commitment to
respect human rights; (b) a due diligence process; and (c) a remediation
process.65 The policy commitment should be “approved at the most senior
level of the business enterprise”66; “[s]tipulates the enterprise’s human
rights expectations of personnel, business partners and other parties
directly linked to its operations, products or services,”67 and “[i]s reflected
in operational policies and procedures necessary to embed it throughout
the business enterprise,”68 among other criteria. As for the due diligence
process, it should “include assessing actual and potential human rights
impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and
communicating how impacts are addressed.”69
Businesses should also perform human rights impact assessments
and integrate the results of those assessments “across relevant internal
functions and processes[.]”70 Specifically, “effective integration” means
that “[r]esponsibility for addressing such impacts is assigned to the
appropriate level and function within the business enterprise”71 and
“[i]nternal decision-making, budget allocations and oversight processes
enable effective responses to such impacts.”72 Businesses should also track
the effectiveness of their responses and communicate externally on the
ways they are addressing human rights impacts.73 Finally, “[w]here
business enterprises identify that they have caused or contributed to

64. Id.
65. Id. at 15–16.
66. Id. at 16.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 20–21
72. Id. at 21.
73. See id. at 23.
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adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in their remediation
through legitimate processes.”74
Collectively, the UNGPs set a normative baseline of expectations
regarding corporate conduct and human rights. The challenge is that the
UNGPs are only enforced if businesses willingly abide by them or if other
actors provide incentives for business to do so. There are a number of
organizations that encourage companies to adopt the UNGPs. For
example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises introduced a chapter on
human rights that aligns with the Ruggie Framework and the UNGPs.75
The American Bar Association76 and International Bar Association77 have
both endorsed the UNGPs. Despite their resistance to the UN Norms, the
International Chamber of Commerce has stated that it “actively supports
its members to scale up implementation of the UNGPs—including the
deployment of accessible training and toolkits—and [that it] will continue
to intensify these efforts to achieve the maximum on the ground impact.”78
II. SYMBOLIC HUMAN RIGHTS: THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND
PRACTICE
The previous Part highlighted the various ways that government
actors are encouraging corporations and other business organizations to
comply with human rights norms. The key question is whether these
strategies are working. On the surface, the picture looks promising. Many
of the largest companies in the world publicly commit to various human
rights institutions such as the United Nations Guiding Principles
(UNGPs); the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR); the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); and the International Labor
Organization’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work (ILO Fundamental Principles). Table 1 lists the Fortune 500’s Top
Ten companies of 2021 and identifies the various human rights
instruments or principles to which these companies have committed.
74. Id. at 24.
75. See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3 (2011) (saying that
the guidelines include “a new human rights chapter, which is consistent with the Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’
Framework”).
76. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., RESOLUTION (2012).
77. INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA PRACTICAL GUIDE ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS
LAWYERS 7 (2016) (stating that “[i]n order to help bar associations and lawyers better understand these
issues, the IBA committed to prepare [this guide] that would ‘set out in detail the core content of the
UNGPs, how they can be relevant to the advice provided to clients. . . and their potential implications
for law firms as business enterprises with a responsibility to respect human rights’”).
78. INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ¶ 9.
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Table 1: Human Rights Instruments in Policies of Fortune 500
Top Ten List
Fortune Company
Company
Human Rights
>??
Name
Document
Instrument
@?@A
Ranking
A
Walmart
Human Rights
• UNGPs
Statement79
• UDHR
• ILO Fundamental
Principles
@
Amazon
Global Human • UNGPs
Rights
• UDHR
80
Principles
• Core Conventions
of the ILO
• ILO Fundamental
Principles
G
Apple
Our
• IBHR
Commitment to
• ILO Fundamental
Human
Principles
Rights81
• UNGPs
H
CVS Health
Human Rights
• UDHR
Policy82
• ICCPR
• ICESCR ILO
• Fundamental
Principles
>
United
Commitment to • UNGPs
Health
Human Rights83 • ILO Fundamental
Principles

79. Walmart Policies & Guidelines: Human Rights Statement, WALMART
https://corporate.walmart.com/policies#human-rights-statement [https://perma.cc/C4H6-AXXB].
80. Amazon Global Human Rights Principles, AMAZON, https://sustainability.aboutamazon.co
m/people/human-rights/principles [https://perma.cc/W9ES-P48L].
81. Our Commitment, supra note 7.
82. Human
Rights
Policy,
CVS HEALTH, https://cvshealth.com/policies/humanrights#:~:text=At%20CVS%20Health%20we%20are,supporting%20internationally%20recognized
%20human%20rights.&text=We%20commit%20to%20going%20beyond,impacts%20in%20our%2
0direct%20operations [https://perma.cc/2BV9-53VX ].
83. Commitment to Human Rights, UNITEDHEALTH GRP.,https://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/
whoweare/ourculture/ethicsintegrity/humanrights.html#:~:text=We%20abide%20by%20all%20natio
nal,diverse%20work%20environment%20for%20all [https://perma.cc/K32N-3EZJ].
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J
K

Berkshire
Hathaway
McKesson
Amerisource
Bergen

N/A

N/A
•

Human Rights
Policy85

•
•
•
•

L

Alphabet

Human Rights
Policy86
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UN Global
Compact (UNGC)84
UNGPs
UNGC
10Principles
ILO Fundamental
Principles
United Nations
Sustainable
Development Goals

•
•
•

UDHR
UNGPs
Global Network
Initiative
Principles (GNI
Principles)
A?
Exxon Mobil Respecting
• UDHR
Human Rights87
• UNGPs
• ILO Fundamental
Principles
If these patterns are widespread, then the significance is profound:
the direct audience for international human rights norms now includes
business organizations that may incorporate these norms directly into their
own operations regardless of the policy positions of the governments that
regulate their conduct. No longer will intransigent governments serve as
roadblocks to human rights agreements. Instead, these agreements may
“shortcut the state” by appealing directly and independently to a second
audience of non-state actors: business organizations. These organizations
may conform their own activities to the prescriptions of these norms,
84. McKesson Joins United Nations Global Compact Initiative, MCKESSON (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.mckesson.com/About-McKesson/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2020/McKesson-JoinsUnited-Nations-Global-Compact-Initiative/ [https://perma.cc/ZA39-BN96].
85. AMERISOURCE BERGEN, HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 1 n.1 (Sept. 30, 2020).
86. Human Rights, GOOGLE, https://about.google/intl/ALL_us/human-rights/
[https://perma.cc/V8LB-3DNN].
87. Human Rights, EXXON MOBIL (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Sustainability/Sustainability-Report/Social/HumanRights#Respectinghumanrights [https://perma.cc/2CFA-CA43].
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which has significant implications given the global footprint of many of
these companies.
Unfortunately, there are a few missing pieces in this otherwise
optimistic picture. One problem is that these practices may not be
widespread but instead limited to large, consumer-facing companies.
Another problem is that the “market” for international human rights
agreements may privilege the adoption of some agreements over others.
This is a particular problem if an agreement’s popularity among non-state
actors reflects its popularity among state actors. Here, the non-state
audience is not compensating for state recalcitrance but instead reinforcing
the preferences of state governments. This type of situation may lead to
inequitable results for the beneficiaries of those agreements because some
individuals and communities may receive an added layer of protection
while others continue to have their rights and interests ignored.
The final problem is perhaps the most significant: the gap between
company rhetoric and practice. Over the years, several lawsuits have been
brought against companies alleging significant human rights practices in
their supply chains—even against those companies that have committed
to human rights in their policies, statements, and supplier codes of
conduct. Consider the infamous case of Chevron and its environmental
impact in Ecuador, which has served as the basis for numerous legal
proceedings before domestic and foreign courts, international arbitral
tribunals, and even the International Criminal Court.88 Or consider the
numerous lawsuits filed against chocolate companies such as Mars,
Hershey, and Nestle concerning child labor in the cocoa supply chain,89
including Doe v. Nestle.90 In the technology space, examples include the
lawsuit filed against Google, Tesla, Microsoft, Apple, and Alphabet on
behalf of plaintiffs “who are either guardians of children killed in tunnel
or walls collapses while mining cobalt in the DRC, or are children who
were maimed in such accidents.”91 Similarly, there was also a lawsuit
against JC Penney and The Children’s Place for harms resulting from the
collapse of Rana Plaza in Bangladesh, which was the site of several

88. See generally Texaco/Chevron Lawsuits (Re Ecuador), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (May
7, 2003), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador1/ [https://perma.cc/92CE-NBJC].
89. See, e.g., Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 Fed. Appx.
460 (9th Cir. 2018).
90. Doe v. Nestle, 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018).
91. Lawsuit Against Apple, Google, Tesla, and Others (Re Child Labour, DRC), BUS. & HUM.
RTS. RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/lawsuitagainst-apple-google-tesla-and-others-re-child-labour-drc/ [https://perma.cc/D3N6-7PSD]; see also
Class Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v. Apple, No. 1:19-cv-03737 (D.D.C. Dec.
15, 2019).
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garment factories that produced goods for the defendants.92 Finally,
consider the lawsuit against Wal-Mart brought by employees of its
overseas suppliers for the labor abuses they suffered when Wal-Mart
declined to enforce its own code of conduct.93 The above examples show
a clear gap between corporate rhetoric and practice. This gap demonstrates
that while companies may commit to human rights instruments, they may
not operate in accordance with these instruments and their advertised
human rights policies.
The gap between rhetoric and action demonstrates the risk of
“symbolic compliance” by corporations. Lauren Edelman warns about the
dangers of “symbolic structures,” which Edelman defines as “a policy or
procedure that is infused with value irrespective of its effectiveness.”94
Some symbolic structures may prove effective while others do not.95 The
danger is that, when laws are ambiguous, “savvy organizations may devise
forms of compliance that symbolically demonstrate attention to law while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to preserve managerial prerogatives and
practices that are seen as advancing business goals.”96
It is not difficult to see how these dangers may arise in the human
rights practices of corporations. It is encouraging that several of the
world’s leading companies publish policies and statements that reference
international human rights instruments—even ones that their own home
jurisdictions did not join. But there is a strong risk that these policies may
be simply “symbolic structures” at some companies that are intended to
win the favor of consumers, investors, and regulators, but, ultimately, they
change very little. Companies frequently adopt symbolic human rights
policies to appease important stakeholders, such as consumers. But
consumers may be unable to evaluate the quality of company policies. The
result is that these policies can remain symbolic because we, as consumers,
often reward them for that symbolism but not the results.
Imagine two companies: Alpha and Beta. Alpha has adopted policies
that are symbolic but has also proved quite effective in minimizing its
adverse human rights impacts in its supply chain. Beta also has a company
policy that references human rights norms, but Beta does not implement
its own policies in any meaningful manner. Both companies publish their
policies on their websites. An external observer, such as a consumer, may
be unable to differentiate between the company policies and practices of
92. Rahaman v. JC Penney Corp., 2016 WL 2616375 1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016).
93. See Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
94. LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL
RIGHTS 5 (2016).
95. See id.
96. Id. at 31.
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these two companies. On the surface, they both appear committed to
human rights. Consumers who like that commitment subsequently reward
both companies similarly by purchasing their products and services. But
only Alpha’s policies and practices are effective and, as a result, likely
more costly to maintain. If consumers favor both companies similarly,
despite the differences in practices, then it may be difficult for Alpha to
maintain a higher compliance standard when its rival, Beta, can win
similar market rewards while expending less on its own human rights
practices. There is therefore a risk that the proliferation of “symbolic
structures” may lead to a “race to the bottom” as companies face limited
market incentives to upgrade their practices. The equilibrium may form at
the level of symbolism when companies do enough to appear to care about
human rights even if their actual practices diverge from those symbols.
The danger of symbolism is present even when companies want to
do the right thing. This is because a company’s policies and practices may
come to represent the ideal separate and apart from the consequences of
those policies and practices. In the context of civil rights, Edelman writes:
As these policies and programs become commonplace in
organizations, employers and employees alike tend to equate the
mere presence of these structures with legal compliance and become
less aware of whether the structures actually promote legal ideals.
Eventually the ideals underlying law become so closely associated
with organizational structures that legal actors, as well as
organizational actors, understand compliance in terms of the presence
or absence of these structures and thus fail to scrutinize their
effectiveness.97

The risk is that a well-meaning company may copy the practices of
its peers, assuming that those practices are “best practices.” This may be a
particularly acute risk when a company sees that its peer is rewarded by
consumers for those practices, irrespective of the effectiveness of those
practices.98 Companies may also copy each other when they do not know
how they should operate themselves. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W.
Powell explain that “[u]ncertainty is also a powerful force that encourages
imitation,”99 and “[w]hen organizational technologies are poorly
understood . . . when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment
creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on

97. Id. at 12.
98. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 34 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV., no. 2,
Apr. 1983, at 147, 153 (discussing legitimacy and mimetic isomorphism).
99. Id. at 151.
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other organizations.”100 Critically, “[o]rganizations tend to model
themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to
be more legitimate or successful.”101 Corporate human rights practices are
plagued by both these problems, leading to an enhanced risk of imitation
without evaluation. Company policies therefore become less about
devising organizational responses that address real problems effectively
and more about the replication of popular, but potentially ineffective,
policies and procedures. And it is the power of symbolism that drives the
popularity because those policies and practices are equated with
compliance even when that compliance is not forthcoming.
The risk of symbolism can help explain significant shortfalls in the
implementation of the UNGPs. A recent study for the European
Commission found that voluntary measures are inadequate for
encouraging meaningful implementation of human rights in supply
chains.102 According to the study, only “one-third of business respondents
indicated that their companies undertake due diligence which takes into
account all human rights and environmental impacts, and a further onethird undertake due diligence limited to certain areas.”103 Unfortunately, it
appears that most of these companies are focusing their due diligence
efforts to first tier suppliers only.104
Other reports and assessments confirm that businesses are still falling
short of implementing meaningful human rights due diligence practices.
A 2018 report of the United Nations Working Group on Business and
Human Rights found that “[a]ccording to human rights benchmarking and
rating assessments, the majority of companies covered by the assessments
do not demonstrate practices that meet the requirements set by the Guiding
Principles.”105 In 2020, the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB)
assessed the “disclosures of 229 global companies across five sectors [that
were] identified as presenting the greatest risk of negative human rights
impacts . . . agricultural
products,
extractives,
apparel,
ICT
100. Id.
101. Id. at 152.
102. European Commission Promises Mandatory Due Diligence Legislation in 2021,
RESPONSIBLE BUS. CONDUCT (Apr. 30, 2020), https://responsiblebusinessconduct.eu/wp/2020/04/30
/european-commission-promises-mandatory-due-diligence-legislation-in-2021/
[https://perma.cc/LQ6R-P6MR].
103. LISE SMIT, CLAIRE BRIGHT, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, MATTHIAS BAUER, HANNA
DERINGER, DANIELA BAEZA-BREINBAUER, FRANCISCA TORRES-CORTÉS, FRANK ALLEWELDT,
SENDA KARA, CAMILLE SALINIER & HÉCTOR TEJERO TOBED, BRITISH INST. OF INT’L & COMPAR. L.,
STUDY ON DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE SUPPLY CHAINS: FINAL REPORT 16 (Jan.
2020) [hereinafter STUDY ON DUE DILIGENCE].
104. See id.
105. U.N. Gen. Assembly, The Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/73/163 ¶ 25 (July 16,
2018).

62

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:41

manufacturing, and . . . auto manufacturing.”106 The CHRB found that
while a “number of companies are meeting the fundamental expectations
of the [UNGPs], with strong commitments and rigorous procedures in
place,”107 two significant challenges remained. First, “[h]uman rights due
diligence, despite being so crucial for the effective management of human
rights risks, remains an area of poor performance across all sectors, with
nearly half of the companies assessed (46.2%) failing to score any points
for this part of the assessment.”108 Second, “[e]ven for those companies
with robust commitments and management systems, these do not
automatically translate at a practical level, with allegations of severe
human rights violations regularly raised, even against some of the highest
scoring companies.”109
Even the business sector has admitted that the implementation of the
UNGPs has been lackluster. The International Chamber of Commerce
stated that it “shares frustration with the international community that the
implementation of the UNGPs remains incomplete”110 and that it is
“concerned that the global collaborative approach enshrined in the UNGPs
is at risk of erosion without concerted action.”111 In its view, one of the
problems is lack of engagement by government actors: “[I]t is of concern
that only a limited number of governments have brought forward national
action plans under the UNGPs to date. We urge all governments who have
not done so to commence the development of robust action plans without
delay.”112 But governments are not the only actors who can encourage
corporate compliance with human rights norms. The following Parts
explore how shareholders, as private actors, can help to fill the void left
by government involvement.
III. SURMOUNTING SYMBOLISM: SOCIALIZING COMPANIES
TO HUMAN RIGHTS
Symbols can offer an important starting point; the problem arises
when we treat them as the finishing line. But as the starting line, symbols
can offer a foothold within an organization that can serve as an entry point
for change. In the government context, Thomas Risse, Stephen Roppe, and
106. CHRB & WORLD BENCHMARKING ALL., CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS BENCHMARK: 2020
KEY FINDINGS 3 (2020) [hereinafter CHRB 2020 KEY FINDINGS].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also id. at 9–10 (“Of the 229 companies assessed, 104 had at least one allegation of
a serious human rights impact meeting the CHRB severity threshold, with 225 allegations reported in
total.”).
110. INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., supra note 78, ¶ 7.
111. Id.
112. Id. ¶ 8.
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Kathryn Sikkink discussed the “spiral model” of socializing states to
improve their human rights practices.113 State practice, like company
practice, is also susceptible to empty rhetoric that does not translate into
meaningful change. But, according to the spiral model, rhetoric can still
perform important work.
The spiral model consists of five distinct phases: repression, denial,
tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior.114 If
transnational advocacy groups can gather sufficient evidence of human
rights violations, the process moves into a phase in which the government
responds to international pressure with denial that “reflect[] a continuing
refusal to recognize the validity of international human rights norms and
thus an unwillingness to submit themselves to international jurisdiction in
such matters.”115 Despite these initial denials, the government may
subsequently sign international treaties as part of “tactical concessions”
used to get “the international human rights community ‘off their
backs.’”116 That government may have adopted the rhetoric for purely
instrumental reasons, such as responding to NGO scrutiny and shaming.
But by adopting the rhetoric, the government concedes the validity of the
underlying human rights norms, which can then serve as the basis for
evaluating its subsequent conduct and potentially lead to greater
institutionalization of those norms.117 The tactical concessions can then
serve as a starting point for additional institutionalization that gives those
human rights norms prescriptive status, such as through ratification and
implementation of domestic legislation that can encourage rule-consistent
behavior.118
The spiral model can also explain company responses to “naming
and shaming” over its human rights practices. Companies may also adopt
human rights policies, statements, codes of conduct, initiatives, and other
measures to rehabilitate their public images following a crisis, shore up
reputational capital in anticipation of a future crisis, or to gain favor with
consumers who may value companies that espouse human rights values.119
Of course, companies may also adopt such measures if their leaders and
113. See THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS & DOMESTIC CHANGE
(Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE POWER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS].
114. Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction and Overview, in THE PERSISTENT POWER
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 6–7 (Thomas Risse, Stephan C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2013).
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Nicole Deitelhoff & Klaus Dieter Wolf, Business and Human Rights, in THE
PRESISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 222, 230 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn
Sikkink eds., 2013).
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employees genuinely desire to integrate human rights norms into company
operations. But regardless of whether the motivation is instrumental or
genuine, the result may be the same: the incorporation of human rights
norms into company policies and procedures may serve as a “foothold”
for both internal and external actors as they pressure companies to adhere
to their own rhetoric.120
For example, in several lawsuits, consumers have used companies’
symbols of human rights compliance—such as policies and codes of
conduct—to criticize companies for publicly expressing that they care
about human rights but then failing to implement those policies in practice.
In Hodsdon v. Mars, the plaintiff pointed out that Mars’s human rights
policy referenced the UNGPs and committed to human rights due
diligence.121 Plaintiff also noted that its supplier code of conduct
referenced the ILO Convention and prohibited the use of child labor.122
According to the plaintiff, “although Mars recognizes that the use of child
and/or slave labor in its supply chain is wrong and its corporate business
principles and supplier code explicitly forbid child and slave labor by its
suppliers, it materially omits to disclose to consumers at the point of
purchase the likelihood that its Chocolate Products are made from cocoa
beans produced by Ivorian children engaged in the Worst Forms of Child
Labor.”123
Similarly, in Doe v. Wal-Mart, employees of Wal-Mart’s overseas
factories referenced the codes of conduct that Wal-Mart entered into with
its suppliers, which gave Wal-Mart the right to engage in on-site
inspections to monitor and implement the suppliers’ compliance with WalMart’s standards.124 These standards “require[d] foreign suppliers to
adhere to local laws and local industry standards regarding working
conditions like pay, hours, forced labor, child labor, and
discrimination.”125 Ultimately, Wal-Mart used these codes of conduct but
then failed to exercise the contractual rights it possessed: “Wal-Mart
represents to the public that it improves the lives of its suppliers’
employees and that it does not condone any violation of the Standards.
However, plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart did not adequately monitor its
suppliers and that Wal-Mart knows its suppliers often violate the
Standards.”126
120. Id. at 230.
121. Complaint for Violation of California Consumer Protection Laws ¶ 49, Hodsdon v. Mars,
Inc., No. 3:15-cv-04450-RS (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2015).
122. Id.
123. Id. ¶ 53.
124. Doe v. Wal-Mart, 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
125. Id. at 680.
126. Id.
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More recently, in Doe v. Apple, the plaintiffs continually pointed to
the gap between what companies espouse—their symbols of human rights
compliance—and the realities on the ground in their supply chain.
Referencing an Amnesty International report, they alleged:
Defendants Apple, Alphabet, Dell, Microsoft and Tesla all have
specific policies claiming to prohibit child labor in their supply
chains. Their failure to actually implement these policies to stop
forced child labor in cobalt mining is an intentional act to avoid
ending their windfall of getting cheap cobalt mined by forced child
labor that they are acutely aware of.127

The plaintiffs drew particular attention to Apple’s “Statement on
Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking and Slavery in Our Business and
Supply Chain” in which the company identifies its various contributions
to promoting human rights.128 According to plaintiffs, these and similar
company and industry initiatives demonstrate the defendants’ knowledge
of its human rights violations but unwillingness to address those violations
meaningfully.129
In these lawsuits, plaintiffs used the symbolic rhetoric—expressed in
human rights policies, supplier codes, or otherwise—to highlight the
divergence between the symbols and reality. In these strategies, we can
spot some of the phases of the spiral model. Specifically, tactical
concessions may serve as subsequent pressure points for change. Many of
the company defendants adopted their human rights policies and initiatives
in response to public exposure of conditions in their supply chains and the
subsequent criticism they faced. As such, many of these policies and
initiatives were likely adopted for instrumental reasons as “tactical
concessions.” But the challenge for companies is that “[t]actical
concessions often do not have their intended effect of pacifying the
transnational public or consumers. Instead, they may serve as new anchors
for the transnational networks to intensify their pressure.”130 By adopting
these symbols, the companies had conceded the validity of those human
rights norms, acknowledging that those norms should influence company
conduct. By making those concessions, the companies opened themselves
up the possibility that stakeholders will hold them to their words. These
symbols—possibly adopted as tactical concessions to external pressure—
thereby exposed companies to legal liability when they subsequently
failed to implement those symbols. For example, Wal-Mart adopted a
127. Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, Doe v. Apple, No. 1:19-cv03737, ¶ 84 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2019) (emphasis from original removed).
128. Id. at ¶ 16.
129. Id. at ¶ 17.
130. Deitelhoff & Dieter Wolf, supra note 119, at 230.
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supplier code of conduct that it did not adequately monitor or implement,
giving rise to a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, among other claims.131
Similarly, Mars’s human rights policies and supplier codes of conduct
prohibit the worst forms of child labor that continue to occur in its supply
chain.132 And likewise, Apple and others committed to and supported
various human rights organizations and efforts, including those in the
DRC, while cobalt mining continues to endanger the physical security of
the children working in those supply chains.133
These examples illustrate two features of symbols. First, they may be
adopted for purely instrumental reasons, intended for public relations, and,
consequently, fail to change company practices sufficiently to eliminate
the human rights violations. But, and second, they can also offer
stakeholders, such as many of the plaintiffs, a “foothold” in an
organization. By adopting the symbols, these companies have
acknowledged both the validity of these symbols in general and their
application to the companies’ conduct. The subsequent gap between
rhetoric and conduct does not go unobserved and can serve as the basis for
both legal and reputational sanctions that further institutionalize these
norms within companies.
It is also important to remember that some of the limitations of the
original spiral model also apply here. The spiral model predicted that
governments may move from repression into subsequent phases where
transnational networks could gather sufficient evidence of human rights
violations.134 One may worry that absent such evidence, neither
transnational nor domestic actors would have sufficient leverage to initiate
any of the subsequent phases. That caution also applies to the human rights
litigation referenced above. This is because many of the complaints rely
upon reports from media, NGOs, academics, government agencies, and
university research centers to illustrate how company practices are falling
short of companies’ rhetoric.135 In other situations, a company or
industry’s human rights violations may not be well documented, thereby
making litigation against the company less likely. As such, a company may
remain in the first phase of the spiral model, where it continues to commit
human rights violations while encountering very little pressure to move
onto the subsequent phases of the model.
131. Doe v. Wal-Mart, 572 F.3d 677, 677–79 (9th Cir. 2009).
132. Complaint for Violation of California Consumer Protection Laws ¶¶ 34–36, Hodsdon v.
Mars, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-04450-RS (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2015) (relying on multiples sources finding
that the Worst Forms of Child Labor in the Ivory Coast are ongoing)
133. Class Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v. Apple, No. 1:19-cv-03737
(D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2019).
134. THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 113, at 24–26.
135. See supra notes 102–110 and accompanying text.
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The spiral model also teaches a second limitation: not all companies
are equally vulnerable to shaming.136 Shaming may work well depending
on whether that company produces for end consumers, its brand
recognition, or the emotional salience of the norm the company has
violated.137 Shaming might also work depending on the “location in the
supply chain, the visibility and prestige of a product, or the size of the
company,”138 as well as “the dependency on certain areas of operation,
such as the location of natural resources or the amount of sunk costs
through previous investments.”139
IV. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS
We also witness phases of the spiral model in shareholder activism
concerning corporate human rights practices. Investors can play an
important role in encouraging human rights due diligence practices. The
EU study on mandatory due diligence, for example, found that one of the
three primary drivers for corporate human rights due diligence was
investors who required a high standard.140 As in litigation, shareholders
anchor their demands in the symbols of human rights that the companies
have expressed: company policies, codes of conduct, and industry
initiatives, among others. As previously explained, companies may have
adopted one or more of these as “tactical concessions” in response to
public scrutiny over previous wrongdoing. But once adopted, these
symbols serve as pressure points for stakeholders to press for greater
organizational reform.141
These pressure points are mapped out by the human rights
instruments that the companies adopt. For example, UNGP 15 states that:
[i]n order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights,
business enterprises should have in place policies and processes
appropriate to their size and circumstances, including:

136. Deitelhoff & Dieter Wolf, supra note 119, at 229.
137. See Kathryn Sikkink, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the
WHO/UNICEF Code, 40 INT’L ORG. 815, 823 (1986) (“Industry sources believed that the emotional
nature of the issue colored the dispute.”).
138. Deitelhoff & Dieter Wolf, supra note 119, at 228–29.
139. Id. at 229.
140. STUDY ON DUE DILIGENCE, supra note 103.
141. See generally George, Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Media Corporations,
supra note 11, at 343 (“Early proposals sought policy statements on respect for human rights, later
proposals asked for information about the firm’s human rights performance and board level
participation and public input concerning human rights risks.[] Earlier proposals between 2005–2009
sought to secure policy commitments and structural change.[] By 20122015, shareholders sought the
specification of criteria for country selection.”) (citations omitted).

68

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:41

(a) A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect
human rights;
(b) A human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent,
mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human
rights;
(c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights
impacts they cause or to which they contribute.142

UNGP 17 further clarifies that a human rights due diligence process
“should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts,
integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and
communicating how impacts are addressed.143
The combination of policy commitment, due diligence process, and
remediation processes can help deepen the commitment that companies
make to human rights and facilitate rule-consistent behavior. The problem
is that many companies stop their institutionalization at the human rights
policy commitment. They may draft one or more human rights policies
and subsequently post them on their website or otherwise market them to
consumers, investors, and civil society. But the commitment stops there.
This shallow institutionalization raises the risk of rhetoric without
substance. This is particularly true when these policies fall short of what
the UNGPs require of the policy commitment, such as approval by senior
leadership and that it “[i]s reflected in operational policies and procedures
necessary to embed it throughout the business enterprise.”144
But even sub-optimal policies can serve as footholds that allow
shareholders to identify the gap between the human rights values that the
companies espouse and their actual practices. By referencing the UNGPs
and other human rights instruments in their policies, companies have
opened the door for shareholders to demand that company managers
operate in a manner consistent with the UNGPs, including implementing
the other components of the corporate responsibility to respect: due
diligence and remediation.
Rule 14a-8 defines a shareholder proposal as a “recommendation or
requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action,
which you intend to present at a meeting of the company’s
shareholders.”145 The shareholder proposal “should state as clearly as
possible the course of action that you believe the company should
142. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF.
HIGH COMM’R 15–16 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guiding
principlesbusinesshr_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AMG-M3BB].
143. Id. at 17.
144. Id. at 16.
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2013).
OF THE
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follow.”146 The shareholder proposal allows shareholders to raise
important matters to the attention of their fellow shareholders and
company management. If the shareholder proponent and the proposal
satisfy the requirements of Rule 14a-8, then a “company must include a
shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in
its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of
shareholders.”147 As discussed in Part III, companies may also omit
proposals if the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance approves the
company’s “no action request,” or if the shareholder proponent reaches a
settlement with the company’s management to withdraw the proposal in
exchange for management’s commitment to take particular steps.148 In the
absence of omission or withdrawal, the company’s management is
required to publish qualifying shareholder proposals in its proxy
statement.
In the past few years, a number of faith-based organizations, as well
as organizations dedicated to sustainable investment, have filed
shareholder proposals with companies of various industries. Some of these
proposals requested that a company disclose its policies on managing
human rights risks. Others requested disclosures regarding the
implementation of policies in place. Significantly, some proposals
requested that the board nominate a candidate with expertise in human
rights and civil rights in order to ensure that the company is not
contributing to human rights abuses. The following Parts discuss
illustrative examples of shareholder proposals submitted to companies in
industries that have been consistently identified as falling short on the
implementation of the UNGPs.
However, there are two disclaimers before continuing. First, faith
based organizations are not the only ones filing proposals concerning
human rights, specifically; or, more generally, they are not the only ones
filing proposals concerning environmental, social, and governance
matters.149 But given the theme of the Berle XII symposium, this Article
focuses on those shareholder proposals that were filed by faith-based
organizations.
Second, faith based investors engage with other issues besides
human rights due diligence in supply chains and other operations. For
example, in 2021, faith based actors also filed proposals relating to climate
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra Part III.
149. See generally HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY PREVIEW 53, 58 (2021); HEIDI
WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY PREVIEW 54, 56 (2020); HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF,
PROXY PREVIEW 53 (2019); HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY PREVIEW 53 (2018).
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risk, employee benefits (paid sick leave), tobacco, and racial justice,
among other issues.150 This Part focuses not on those issues, but on
proposals that reference the UNGPs in order to examine the ways that
shareholder proposals can serve as mechanisms between international law
norms and company practices.
A. Automotive Industry
As noted in the 2020 CHRB Report, the automotive industry
performs poorly when it comes to the implementation of the UNGPs. The
report noted that “[n]ot a single automotive company scored above 50%,
and half scored below 10%.151 Two thirds of the companies scored 0 across
all human rights due diligence indicators (B.2).152 These poor results
suggest implementation of the UNGPs is weak across the sector.”153
Furthermore, the report highlighted the following shortcomings:
• “Forty per cent of companies do not have a public commitment
to respect human rights. Almost ten years since the UNGPs were
endorsed, just over 10% of companies have commitments to
implement them or the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.”154
• “Two thirds of companies scored 0 across all areas of human
rights due diligence.”155
• “On the issues of child labour . . . and forced labour . . . , just
seven companies included requirements such as age verification
and prohibition of recruitment fees or retention of personal
documents in contractual arrangements with suppliers, or
described how they worked with suppliers to eliminate these
issues.”156
• Only “nine companies disclosed information about their
management systems to ensure the responsible sourcing of
minerals . . . or other raw materials such as rubber and
leather . . . .”157
The automotive sector’s poor performance on human rights was
further highlighted in 2019 in a class action lawsuit was filed against Tesla,
among others. The class action accused Tesla and others of “knowingly
150. See HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY PREVIEW 53, 58 (2021).
151. CHRB 2020 KEY FINDINGS, supra note 110, at 7.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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benefiting from and aiding and abetting the cruel and brutal use of young
children in Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) to mine cobalt, a key
component of every rechargeable lithium-ion battery used in the electronic
devices these companies manufacture.”158
The automotive sector’s poor performance has not gone unnoticed
among the faith-based investor community. For example, Investor
Advocates for Social Justice (IASJ) defines its mission as “advocat [ing]
on behalf of a community of investors whose faith-based values promote
human rights, climate justice, racial equity and the common good.”159 The
IASJ introduced an “ongoing, multi-year shareholder advocacy campaign
called the Shifting Gears Initiative, in which faith-based investors are
engaging with 23 auto companies in their portfolios with the goal to
improve human rights due diligence.”160 In its 2020 report, the IASJ found
that the key weaknesses include “[g]overnance and management systems
for human rights,”161 “embedding respect for human rights across the
business,”162 and “[t]raceability and supply chain transparency.”163
Ongoing human rights abuses by the automotive sector places a
number of individuals around the world at risk. The following issues
illustrate these risks: “cobalt used in electric vehicle batteries that may be
sourced from mines in the DRC where child labor is prevalent”; “[l]eather
used in seating may be produced using child labor, while it also contributes
to deforestation, and communities and workers may be exposed to
hazardous chemicals”; “[a]utomotive electronic systems require laborintensive assembly and may be manufactured in countries where forced
labor and child labor are present”; “[m]ica, a component of paints,
coatings, and other parts, may come from illegal mines in India with welldocumented child labor risks, which are also present in Madagascar.”164
Due to these concerns, IASJ affiliates filed shareholder proposals
with six automotive companies in 2020 regarding their human rights
practices, with three going to a vote at General Motors, Lear, and Tesla.165
Referencing the UNGPs, the GM proposal stated that “companies have a
158. Class Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v. Apple, No. 1:19-cv-03737
(D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2019), ¶ 1.
159. IASJ Encourages Auto Companies to Tackle Human Rights in the Supply Chain, INVS.
ADVOC. FOR SOC. JUST., https://iasj.org/shifting-gears-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/2GYA-SXH6].
160. Id.
161. INVESTOR ADVOCATES FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, THE SHIFTING GEARS REPORT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS & DUE DILIGENCE IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 3 (June
2020) [hereinafter IASJ, SHIFTING GEARS].
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY PREVIEW 50 (2020).
165. See IASJ Encourages Auto Companies to Tackle Human Rights in the Supply Chain, supra
note 159.

72

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:41

responsibility to respect human rights throughout their operations and
value chains by conducting due diligence to assess, identify, prevent,
mitigate, and remediate adverse human rights impacts.”166 It then
requested General Motors Company (GM) to “prepare a report . . . on
GM’s systems to ensure effective implementation of its Human Rights
Policy.”167 More specifically, the proposal requested that the report
address the human rights due diligence processes used to “embed respect
for human rights into operations and the value chain,”168 and “provide
access to remedy for human rights impacts connected to the business,”169
and give “indicators used to assess effectiveness .”170
As support for its proposal, the shareholders referenced “[r]eports by
Amnesty International and the 2019 Mining the Disclosures benchmark
found GM’s cobalt due diligence practices to be inadequate given its
awareness of the risk.”171 While noting that GM has human rights policies,
the shareholders faulted GM for failing to “demonstrate how its Human
Rights Policy, Code of Conduct, and Supplier Code are operationalized to
ensure human rights are respected.”172 Specifically, the shareholders said
that “GM does not provide evidence of suppliers’ compliance with labor
laws and its Code, or how GM assures suppliers cascade expectations
through their own supply chains.”173 The proposal gained 32.2%
support.174
Tesla is a particularly poor performer within the automotive industry,
scoring low on indicators related to policy, governance, supplier code,
traceability, and due diligence.175 The IASJ particularly faulted Tesla for
disclosing limited information about human rights; for not providing a
baseline human rights commitment; and for policies that are “thinly
articulated” and focused on compliance and for providing “almost no
evidence of implementation.”176 The CHRB similarly faulted Tesla for
scoring a 6.3 out of 100, which means Tesla fell within the lowest band of
assessed companies within the automotive sector.177 More notably, Tesla
166. PROXY STATEMENT AND NOTICE 2020 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS, GENERAL
MOTORS 94 (2020), https://sec.report/Document/0001193125-20-120812/d752756ddef14a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ES92-GXZ8].
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. IASJ Encourages Auto Companies to Tackle Human Rights in the Supply Chain, supra note
159.
175. IASJ, SHIFTING GEARS, supra note 161, at 12–14.
176. Id. at 18.
177. CHRB, 2020 KEY FINDINGS, supra note 106, at 13.
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scored a zero on human rights due diligence and was subject to at least one
serious human rights allegation.178
The Sisters of the Good Shepherd filed a shareholder proposal with
Tesla, requesting that the board prepare a report “on Tesla’s processes for
embedding respect for human rights within operations and through
business relationships.”179 More specifically, the proposal requested that
this report address (1) “board oversight of human rights”180 and (2)
“human rights due diligence processes, including systems for providing
meaningful remedy when adverse human rights impacts occur.”181 Among
other reasons, the shareholders justified their proposal based on the legal,
reputational, and financial risks created by Tesla’s inadequate attention to
human rights. The shareholders cited as evidence the class action lawsuit
filed against it and the severe risks of human rights abuses that accompany
its supply chain for cobalt, mica, rubber, electronics, lithium, and nickel,
among others.182
The Sisters of Good Shepherd similarly submitted a shareholder
proposal with Lear Corporation, a “leading supplier of seating and
electrical power management systems (E-Systems) to the automotive
industry.”183 Shareholders requested that Lear publish a report “with the
results of a Human Rights Impact Assessment examining the actual and
potential human rights impacts of the company’s high-risk business
activities in its operations and value chain.”184 Given the vast scale of
Lear’s operations, they noted how mismanagement of human rights risks
can lead to legal, competitive, financial and reputational risks.185 While
Lear had a supplier-sustainability policy and a code of conduct,
shareholders were concerned that “investors and customers are unable to
evaluate the extent to which these policies address its most salient
risks.”186 Additionally, they also raised concerns over the lack of
information “on the results of Lear’s evaluations and audits ‘using industry
standards and best practices’ of suppliers’ performance”187 and “whether
178. Id.
179. Tesla, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 25 (May 28, 2020).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Lear Corporation, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 76-77 (filed Apr. 6, 2020)
https://sec.report/Document/0001193125-20-099040/#toc908116_53 [https://perma.cc/22CPWSVS].
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. United States Securities Commission: Notice of Exempt Solicitation for Lear Corporation,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/842162/000121465920003994/m54200px14a6g.htm
[https://perma.cc/9PP3-DTYV].
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the metrics used assess human rights impacts and the extent they align with
international human rights standards, nor is the frequency with which a
supplier is audited, nor the number of audits conducted per year
disclosed.”188 The proposal garnered 44.76% support.189
B. Food and Agriculture
The food and agriculture industry also performs poorly when it
comes to human rights enforcement. In its 2020 report, the CHRB assessed
fifty-seven of the largest agricultural companies in the world and found
that most companies expressed some form of commitment to human
rights, with nearly half committing to specific standards such as those
articulated in the UNGPs.190 However, human rights due diligence
continued to prove a problem. Many companies, for example, failed to
provide any information on their processes and twenty-one companies
scored zero across all human rights due diligence indicators.191 Kraft
Heinz and Tyson Foods were among the poorest performers on human
rights due diligence, reflecting industry-wide low scores, ranging from 67.5 points out of 26.192 In 2021, both of these companies were targeted for
shareholder proposals that sought to improve their human rights due
diligence practices.
The Province of St. Joseph of the Capuchin Order served as lead filer
for a 2021 proposal submitted to Kraft Heinz, with several other faithbased organizations as co-filers.193 The proposal requested that the
company publish a human rights impact assessment “examining the actual
and potential impacts of one or more high risk[] products sold by Kraft
Heinz.”194 The shareholders justified the proposal by pointing out that
“[p]ublic scrutiny is intensifying reputational risks for food products
companies.”195 It referenced media reports by the New York Times, Wall
Street Journal, and CNN relating to significant labor abuses in the supply
chains for palm oil, tomatoes, and shrimp.196 The proposal also identified
the numerous ways that human rights risks pose a threat to Kraft Heinz,
which Kraft Heinz itself acknowledged in its 2020 ESG materiality
188. Id.
189. IASJ Encourages Auto Companies to Tackle Human Rights in the Supply Chain, supra note
159.
190. See CHRB, 2020 KEY FINDINGS, supra note 106, at 19.
191. Id. at 20.
192. Id. at 22.
193. See Human Rights Impact Assessment, ICCR (2020),
https://exchange.iccr.org/node/88002/text [https://perma.cc/4UDQ-PUZ6].
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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assessment when it stated that “Heinz ranks human rights as among the
issues with the greatest impact on the company and of most importance to
shareholders.”197 It also referenced benchmarking reports by Know the
Chain and CHRB to identify specific human rights risks, as well as the
company’s poor response to those risks.198 It concluded by comparing
Kraft Heinz’s human rights practices to those of “[l]eading companies like
Coca-Cola and Nestlé [that] have published HRIAs on high-risk food
products in their supply chains.”199 For these reasons, the proposal
requested that the company prepare an impact assessment that identifies
(a) the human rights standards and principles the company used to perform
the assessment; (b) actual and potential adverse impacts of high-risk
products, and (c) an “[o]verview of how the findings will be acted upon in
order to prevent, mitigate and/or remedy impacts.”200
The shareholders subsequently withdrew the proposal as Kraft Heinz
“committed to conducting a HRIA consistent with the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).”201 The lead filer
stated, “[w]e will continue to work with Kraft Heinz, particularly in the
area of enhanced disclosures on its implementation plans and audit
findings,”202 and “[w]e would like to see the company dramatically
improve its Corporate Human Rights Benchmark score and become a
leader among its peers in respecting human rights.”203 Altogether, this
example illustrates how shareholder proposals can influence company
practices even if they are subsequently withdrawn—so long as the
company commits to meaningful changes in line with the shareholder’s
concerns.204
A similar proposal was filed by the American Baptist Home Mission
Society and several co-filers with Tyson Foods in 2021, requesting that
“the Board of Directors prepare a report . . . on Tyson’s human rights due
diligence process to assess, identify, prevent, mitigate, and remedy actual
and potential human rights impacts.”205 The proposal also requested that
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Julie Wokaty, Investors Commend Kraft Heinz for Efforts to Advance Human Rights Due
Diligence Throughout Its Supply Chain, ICCR (May 5, 2021), https://www.iccr.org/investorscommend-kraft-heinz-efforts-advance-human-rights-due-diligence-throughout-its-supply-chain
[https://perma.cc/6RXR-RRS7].
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See generally Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering
of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262 (2016).
205. Tyson Foods, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://sec.report/Document/0000100493-20-000207/ [https://perma.cc/FN3L-PSK6] [hereinafter
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the report might address “[b]oard oversight of human rights” and
“[h]uman rights due diligence processes, including systems for providing
meaningful remedy when adverse human rights impacts occur.”206
While the proposal was brought by faith based organizations, it
received support from both BlackRock and Vanguard who voted in favor
of it. BlackRock explained that it remained concerned about Tyson’s
disclosures, noting that “the percentage of facilities subject to a third-party
audit represents a very small proportion of the company’s total operations,
limiting shareholders’ full understanding of the company’s approach to
human rights due diligence and its effectiveness.”207 BlackRock also noted
that “existing disclosures lack clarity on whether the company’s suppliers
and subcontractors are complying with Tyson Foods’ standards.”208 It also
noted concerns with the company’s health and safety protocols, among
other concerns.209 Comparably, Vanguard noted that “this was the third
consecutive year that Tyson received a shareholder proposal” regarding its
human rights practices.210 While the Vanguard funds did not support
proposals against Tyson in the past, it voted in favor of the 2021 human
rights due diligence proposal explaining “we identified that Tyson had
realized legal, regulatory, reputational, and investment risks”211 and that
“[w]e believe these were in part because of the board’s lack of oversight
on human rights risks.”212
Similarly to the proposals filed against Tyson, Wendy’s was also
scrutinized for its human rights due diligence process. The Franciscan
Sisters of Allegany filed a proposal with Wendy’s concerning the “welldocumented history of human rights violations in the U.S. agricultural
industry, including slavery, sexual assault, and workplace safety
violations.”213 The proposal argued that “[e]ssential workers in food
supply chains—especially on farms and in meatpacking facilities—are
now also at heightened risk of exposure to, and death from, COVID-19.”214
The proposal requested that the board prepare a report on its supplier code
Tyson Foods, Form DEF 14A]; see generally Investor Advocates for Social Justice, Tyson Dismisses
Shareholders’ Human Rights Concerns at Annual Meeting (Feb. 17, 2021).
206. Id.
207. BLACKROCK, VOTING BULLETIN: TYSON FOODS, INC. 2 (Feb. 11, 2021)
https://bit.ly/2RtBxaV[https://perma.cc/KC55-U8E].
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. VANGUARD, VANGUARD INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP VOTING INSIGHTS: OVERSIGHT OF
HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS AT TYSON 1 (2021), https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/INVTYSON_022021.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU9F-A8DC].
211. Id. at 2.
212. Id.
213. WENDY’S CO., DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (Schedule 14A), 91 (filed Apr. 1, 2021)
214. Id.
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of conduct, and provide information on to what extent the company “audits
and third-party reviews effectively protect workers in its food supply chain
from human rights violations, including harms associated with COVID19.”215 In response, Wendy’s management tried to omit the proposal by
filing a “no action request” with the SEC, arguing that Wendy’s “has
already substantially implemented the Proposal”216 and that the proposal
“deals with matters relating to the Company’s ordinary business
operations.”217 The SEC ultimately denied the request, finding that it was
“[u]nable to concur with exclusion on any of the bases asserted.”218
Ultimately, management recommended that shareholders vote in favor of
the proposal.219 It also explained that, “[T]he Company informed the
Proponent of our willingness to report on the matters requested in the
proposal’s resolution. Nonetheless, the Proponent expressed their desire
for the proposal to be voted on by stockholders at the Annual Meeting.”220
While recommending approval, management continued to state: “[T]he
Company plans to provide stockholders with enhanced public disclosure
on the subject matter contained in the proposal’s resolution as part of our
ongoing ESG reporting.”221 The proposal received overwhelming approval
by shareholders.222
V. EVALUATING THE SHAREHOLDER MECHANISM FOR ENFORCING
HUMAN RIGHTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS
A. Importing International and Foreign Regulatory Approaches
One of the advantages of shareholder proposals is that they can
replicate regulatory norms and requirements that are otherwise absent in a
domestic jurisdiction. As discussed above in Part IV, shareholder
proposals can serve as mechanisms to incorporate the strategies adopted
by international human rights instruments. Several of the proposals
discussed in Part IV, requested that companies disclose how they were
meeting one or more of the three requirements of the UNGP’s corporate

215. Id.
216. Letter from Michael Berner, Vice President – Corporate & Securities Counsel and Chief
Compliance Officer, and Assistant Secretary, The Wendy’s Company, to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (Jan. 8, 2021).
217. Id. at 2.
218. Shareholder Proposal No-Action Responses, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, (Oct. 26, 2021)
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/shareholder-proposal-no-actionresponses.htm [https://perma.cc/NF8R-RM46].
219. WENDY’S CO., DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (Schedule 14A), 92 (filed Apr. 1, 2021).
220. Id. at 93.
221. Id.
222. WENDY’S COMPANY, FORM 8-K for Period Ending May 18, 2021, at 2 (filed May 19, 2021).
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responsibility to respect human rights: (1) policy commitment, (2) due
diligence process, (3) and/or remediation efforts.
For example, the General Motors shareholder proposal requested a
report on company’s effective implementation of its human rights policy,
including due diligence processes and access to remedies.223 The GM
proposal is also notable because it illuminates another criterion that is
essential for differentiating between purely symbolic structures and those
that produce change: effectiveness. Namely, the GM proposal suggested
that the requested human rights report include “indicators used to assess
effectiveness.”224 Similarly, the Tyson Foods shareholder proposal
requested that the company prepare a human rights report that would
“[d]iscuss how Tyson tracks effectiveness of its human rights due
diligence.”225
These requested disclosures are important because the UNGPs
require that “business enterprises should track the effectiveness of their
response”226 so that companies can know “if its human rights policies are
being implemented optimally, whether it has responded effectively to the
identified human rights impacts, and to drive continuous improvement.”227
Ultimately, it is critical for companies to disclose information about the
effectiveness of their policies and procedures because it allows
shareholders and others to differentiate between the companies that adopt
purely symbolic structures and those that adopt actual effective
approaches.
Mandatory disclosure laws are intended to assist with this market
differentiation but may not go far enough to do so. For example, the
California transparency law does not explicitly require information on the
effectiveness of those approaches or how a company even assesses
effectiveness.228 For that reason, recent disclosures under those laws do
not discuss the effectiveness of the company’s policies and procedures.229
223. See supra notes 161–68 and accompanying text.
224. See notes 177–179, supra, and accompanying text.
225. TYSON FOODS, INC., DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (Schedule 14A)24 (filed Feb. 11,
2021).
226. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMM’R 22 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusiness
hr_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AMG-M3BB].
227. Commentary to UNGP 20, 23.
228. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 35.
229. For example, a number of companies do not even address the effectiveness of their policies
and procedures in their disclosures under the California law that are published on their websites. See,
e.g., PERDUE FARMS, STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY
CHAINS ACT OF 2010,
https://corporate.perduefarms.com/pdfs/CA-Transparency-Act.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EGD4-YCEH]; WHOLE FOODS MARKET, CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY
CHAINS ACT DISCLOSURE (2021), https://assets.wholefoodsmarket.com/www/pdfs/WFM%20CA%2
0TISCA%20Disclosure%20rev%2003-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EU3-ZGYZ].
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While legislators have contemplated approaches that would mandate
disclosure on effectiveness of human rights, such efforts have thus far
proven generally unsuccessful.230
In contrast, other countries have had greater success in encouraging
companies to report on effectiveness. For example, Section 54 of the UK
Modern Slavery Act states that a company’s human trafficking statement
may include information on “its effectiveness in ensuring that slavery and
human trafficking is not taking place in its business or supply chains,
measured against such performance indicators as it considers
appropriate.”231 However, the law did not mandate that companies report
effectiveness, thereby leading to sub-optimal reporting on effectiveness.232
The Australia Modern Slavery Act took a different approach and required
that covered companies “describe the actions taken by the reporting entity
and any entity that the reporting entity owns or controls, to assess and
address those risks, including due diligence and remediation processes”233
and “describe how the reporting entity assesses the effectiveness of such
actions.”234 According to the resource guide provided by the Australian
government to companies, “[t]he Act only requires you to explain how you
assess the effectiveness of an entity’s actions. The Act does not ask you to
determine whether an entity’s actions are effective.”235
In sum, the shareholder proposals served as mechanisms to replicate
these disclosure requirements found in international law and the laws of
foreign jurisdictions. The source of the disclosure requirements varied. In
foreign jurisdictions, legislation recommended or required reporting on
how effectiveness is assessed. In contrast, shareholders filed proposals in
order to encourage reporting on effectiveness. Through such strategies,
shareholders not only import substantive human rights norms found in
international law, such as the UNGPs, but also the regulatory strategies
adopted in jurisdictions to comply with those norms.
230. For example, the Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation
Act was notable because it would have required disclosures of the “results of the human rights analysis
conducted pursuant to the Act, including the ranked lists of any identified human rights risks and
impacts” and “[f]or any action taken, the issuer’s assessment of the action’s efficacy and a description
of any outcomes of the action.” ESG Legislation—Ten Bills for Public Companies to Watch in 2021,
ROPES & GRAY 14–15 (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/
2020/11/ESG-Legislation-Ten-Bills-for-Public-Companies-to-Watch-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/
YZE3-UDZQ]. Unfortunately, it appears that the discussion draft was never formally introduced. Id.
231. Modern Slavery Act 2015, Pt 6 § (5)(e).
232. BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., FTSE 100 & THE UK MODERN SLAVERY ACT: FROM
DISCLOSURE TO ACTION 20 (2018) (“Effectiveness remains the lowest performing reporting area.”).
233. Modern Slavery Act, 2018 (Cth) pt 2 § 16(1)(d).
234. Id. § (1)(e).
235. COMMONWEALTH MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2018: GUIDANCE FOR REPORTING ENTITIES 54,
https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/modern-slavery-reporting-entities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6S39-P8U9]; see also id. at 60.
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B. The Nature of Investor Support
The discussion in Part IV demonstrates that many of the human rights
shareholder proposals relying on the UNGPs are filed by shareholders with
a faith-based mission. However, even without that scope, a review of As
You Sow’s proxy reports reveals that faith-based organizations routinely
take the lead on filing shareholder proposals about human rights.236
But it is a mistake to attribute shareholder activism on human rights
exclusively to faith-based groups. While faith-based groups may file these
proposals, other actors have supported them. For example, in 2021,
BlackRock published its approach to engaging with companies on human
rights impacts, clarifying that it “ask[s] companies to implement processes
to identify, manage, and prevent adverse human rights impacts that are
material to their business, and provide robust disclosures on these
practices.”237 BlackRock highlighted that harmful impacts on human
rights can damage a range of actors and lead to reputational, legal,
financial, and regulatory risks for companies.238 BlackRock clarified that
it values disclosures regarding how companies are managing their human
rights impacts. For example, BlackRock valued information on board
oversight on human rights, “including whether the full board or a specific
committee has responsibility to oversee related policies and processes, and
the type and frequency of information reviewed,”239 and how the company
“measures and assesses the effectiveness of its human rights management
and mitigation strategy.”240
More broadly, BlackRock’s Global Principles of Investment
Stewardship state that “[c]ompanies should articulate how they address
adverse impacts that could arise from their business practices and affect
critical business relationships with their stakeholders.”241 BlackRock
“expect[s] companies to implement, to the extent appropriate, monitoring
processes (often referred to as due diligence) to identify and mitigate
potential adverse impacts, and grievance mechanisms to remediate any
actual adverse impacts,”242 explaining that “[t]he maintenance of trust
236. See HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY PREVIEW 53, 58 (2021); HEIDI WELSH &
MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY PREVIEW 54, 56 (2020); HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY
PREVIEW 53 (2019); HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY PREVIEW 53 (2018).
237. BLACKROCK, OUR APPROACH TO ENGAGEMENT WITH COMPANIES ON THEIR HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPACTS 1 (2021) https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blkcommentary-engagement-on-human-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/897V-KJKY].
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP GLOBAL PRINCIPLES 10 (2021),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-engprinciplesglobal.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3UX-UUVT].
242. Id.
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within these relationships is often equated with a company’s social license
to operate.”243 It recommends that “companies should report on how they
have identified their key stakeholders and considered their interests in
business decision-making, demonstrating the applicable governance,
strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.”244 Finally, it
recommends that this approach is “overseen by the board, whose job it is
to ensure that the approach taken is informed by and aligns with the
company’s purpose.”245 But BlackRock has not always supported these
types of proposals. In 2020, for example, BlackRock voted against a
shareholder proposal requesting a report on human rights due diligence at
Sanderson Farms.246 Similarly, it opposed a proposal requesting the
establishment of a human rights oversight committee at Alphabet.247
Proxy advisors have also supported human rights proposals. In 2020,
Glass Lewis recommended that shareholders vote in favor of proposals
requesting human rights due diligence reports at Tyson Foods, Sanderson
Farms, and Pilgrim’s Pride.248 Additionally, Glass Lewis recommended in
favor of a proposal at Alphabet requesting that the board establish a human
rights risk oversight committee, explaining that “[a]lthough Alphabet had
implied some level of human rights-related oversight through its audit
committee, we believed that its significant exposure to legal, reputational,
and regulatory human rights-related risks warranted additional
oversight.”249
In its 2020 guidelines for the 2021 proxy season, Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) recommended “[g]enerally vot[ing] for
proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor
and/or human rights standards and policies unless such information is
already publicly disclosed.”250 ISS also recommended a case-by-case
analysis “on proposals to implement company or company supplier labor
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See
BLACKROCK, VOTING BULLETIN: SANDERSON FARMS 1
(2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-sanderson-mar2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9RZ-RS2U]
247. See
BLACKROCK,
VOTING
BULLETIN:
ALPHABET,
INC.,
1
(2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-alphabet-jul2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y755-WTCK]..
248. 2020 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 32 (Courteney Keatinge, Max
Darrow,
Katelyn
Roth,
Kate
Flanagan
&
Dimitri
Zagoroff
eds.,
2020),
https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/2020-Proxy-Season-Review-ShareholderProposals.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2QG-SKEH].
249. Id. at 8.
250. ISS, UNITED STATES: PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES BENCHMARK POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 65 (2020) https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/USVoting-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3UW-LR8Q].
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and/or human rights standards and policies.”251 To do so, ISS recommends
considering, among others, the following factors: “[w]hether or not
existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized
standards,”252 “[c]ompany participation in fair labor organizations or other
internationally recognized human rights initiatives,”253; “[r]ecent,
significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human
rights at the company or its suppliers,”254 and “[d]eviation from industry
sector peer company standards and practices.”255
ISS also recommended case-by-case analysis on proposals that
request a company to conduct a human rights risk assessment, or to report
on its process, considering factors such as “[t]he degree to which existing
relevant policies and practices are disclosed, including information on the
implementation of these policies and any related oversight
mechanisms,”256 “[t]he company’s industry and whether the company or
its suppliers operate in countries or areas where there is a history of human
rights concerns,”257 and “[r]ecent significant controversies, fines, or
litigation regarding human rights involving the company or its suppliers,
and whether the company has taken remedial steps,”258 among other
factors.
In its 2021 Sustainability Proxy Voting Guidelines, ISS explained
that “[m]any [i]nvestors believe that companies would benefit from
adopting a human rights policy based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Labor Organization’s Core Labor
Standards.”259 ISS therefore stated that “[e]fforts that seek greater
disclosure on a company’s labor practices and that seek to establish
minimum standards for a company’s operations will be supported,”260 and
that “requests for independent monitoring of overseas operations will be
supported.”261 The Sustainability Guidelines recommended voting in favor
of a number of different types of human rights proposals, including ones
requesting reports on company or supplier labor and human rights
statement and policies; implementing human rights standards and
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. ISS, UNITED STATES: SUSTAINABILITY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 2021 POLICY
GUIDELINES 68 (2020), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/specialty/SustainabilityUS-Voting-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR36-QHER].
260. Id.
261. Id.
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workplace codes of conduct; and “independent monitoring programs in
conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to
monitor supplier and licensee compliance with codes.”262
C. Excluded Shareholder Proposals
Not all shareholder proposals reach a vote. Sometimes a company is
able to exclude the proposal from its proxy materials by filing a “no-action
request” with the SEC, arguing that there is a basis for excluding the
proposal under Rule 14a-8. For example, in 2020, the Congregation of the
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace submitted a shareholder proposal to PPG
Industries, Inc. that referenced the UNGPs and requested that the board
prepare a report “on PPG’s processes for implementing human rights
commitments within company owned operations and through business
relationships.”263 Using Rule 14a-8(i)(10), PPG sought to omit the
proposal, arguing that it had substantially implemented the proposal
because it had adopted, implemented, and published code of ethics,
supplier code of conduct, and sustainability policy and reports.264 The
Division of Corporate Finance (“Division”) concurred that Rule 14a8(i)(10) provided a basis to exclude the proposal.265
Another basis for omitting a proposal is Rule 14a-8(i)(7) that permits
a company to exclude a proposal if it “deals with a matter relating to the
company’s ordinary business operations.”266 “The purpose of the
exception is ‘to confine the resolution of ordinary business problems to
management and the board of directors, since it is impracticable for
shareholders to decide how to solve such problems at an annual
shareholders meeting.’”267
Companies have taken advantage of this exception to exclude
proposals that address human rights issues. For example, in 2021,
262. Id. at 69.
263. Investor Advocates for Social Justice, 2020 Shareholder Proposals: PPG,
https://iasj.org/wp-content/uploads/PPG-Human-Rights-Disclosure-Resolution-2020-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52EN-XNFK].
264. December 6, 2019 Letter from Daniel G. Fayock Assistant General Counsel and Secretary
(PPG) to Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission re: Omission of Shareholder Proposal Submitted by the Congregation of the Sisters of
St. Joseph of Peace; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Section 14(a), Rule 14a-8,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2019/sistersstjosephppg121619-14a8incoming.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BJW-LADT].
265. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. 2019-2020 No Action Responses Issued Under Rule 14a-8,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/shareholder-proposals-2019-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CUE5-JVUM].
266. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
267. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L (CF) (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/stafflegal-bulletin-14l-shareholder-proposals#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/X6GE-9XD9] (quoting Release No.
34-40018 (May 21, 1998)).
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American Baptist Home Mission Society and others submitted a proposal
at Chevron that requested that the board commission an independent thirdparty report “analyzing how Chevron’s policies, practices, and the impacts
of its business, perpetuate racial injustice and inflict harm on communities
of color in the United States.”268 The proposal also stated that the report
should “[a]lign with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights to identify, assess, prevent, mitigate, and remedy human rights
impacts.”269 Chevron sought to exclude the proposal based on Rule 14a8(i)(7) “because the Proposal relates to the Company’s litigation strategy
and the conduct of ongoing litigation to which the Company is a party.”270
The staff of the Division concurred that Rule 14a-8(i)(7) provides a basis
to exclude the proposal.271
In recent years, the Division issued a number of Staff Legal Bulletins
(“SLBs”) that further refined the parameters of the ordinary business
exception.272 In SLB No. 14K, the Division clarified that the exception’s
consideration of micromanagement “rests on an evaluation of the manner
in which a proposal seeks to address the subject matter raised, rather than
the subject matter itself. . . . two proposals focusing on the same subject
matter may warrant different outcomes based solely on the level of
prescriptiveness with which the proposals approach that subject matter.”273
SLB No. 14K further clarified that “we look to whether the proposal
seeks intricate detail or imposes a specific strategy, method, action,
outcome or timeline for addressing an issue, thereby supplanting the
judgment of management and the board.”274 According to the guidance, “a
proposal framed as a request that the company consider, discuss the
feasibility of, or evaluate the potential for a particular issue generally
would not be viewed as micromanaging matters of a complex nature.
However, a proposal, regardless of its precatory nature, that prescribes
specific timeframes or methods for implementing complex policies,
268. Letter from Investor Advocates for Social Justice, to Office of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp.
Fin., SEC 2 (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a8/2021/stfrancischevron033021-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX6C-QWHU].
269. Id.
270. Letter from Elizabeth A. Ising, Gibson Dunn, to Office of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp.
Fin., SEC 3 (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a8/2021/stfrancischevron011821-14a8-incoming.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAW5-UC3S].
271. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., Shareholder Proposal No-Action Responses,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/shareholder-proposal-no-action-responses2020-2021.htm [https://perma.cc/HV6B-NCYT] (last visited July 18, 2021).
272. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14J (CF) (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/stafflegal-bulletin-14j-shareholder-proposals#_edn7 [https://perma.cc/K78A-XP8W]; SEC Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14k (CF) (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14kshareholder-proposals [https://perma.cc/X6GE-9XD9].
273. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14k, supra note 267.
274. Id.
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consistent with the Commission’s guidance, [] may run afoul of
micromanagement.”275 Critically, the guidance cautioned that “the
precatory nature of a proposal does not bear on the degree to which a
proposal micromanages”276 and that “[n]otwithstanding the precatory
nature of a proposal, if the method or strategy for implementing the action
requested by the proposal is overly prescriptive, thereby potentially
limiting the judgment and discretion of the board and management, the
proposal may be viewed as micromanaging the company.”277
According to the ICCR, this guidance and other decisions affect the
ability of shareholders to advocate for human rights and other issues:
“During the last four years, major categories of proposals that were
previously found to be acceptable were swallowed up by this new
expansive micromanagement doctrine.”278 For example, according to the
ICCR, “[p]roposals that seek to discourage company involvement in
financing genocide have long been permissible under Staff rulings but
were disrupted by the new micromanagement principle.”279 This was
particularly unfortunate because the “shareholder proposal process has
been critical to shareholder initiatives to persuade their companies not to
directly or indirectly support genocide and other human rights abuses in
the supply chain.”280 The ICCR argued that an “important reversal of prior
staff decisions relating to genocide and human rights occurred in J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. (March 13, 2019), excluding a proposal directed
toward genocide prevention, overturned many Staff precedents based on
ordinary business that previously allowed proposals to ask essentially the
same question but came to the opposite result.”281 ICCR argued that
275. Id. (internal citations omitted). In addressing the first consideration, subject matter, SLB
14K explained:
[W]e believe the focus of an argument for exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) should be on
whether the proposal deals with a matter relating to that company’s ordinary business
operations or raises a policy issue that transcends that company’s ordinary business
operations. When a proposal raises a policy issue that appears to be significant, a
company’s no-action request should focus on the significance of the issue to that company.
If the company does not meet that burden, the staff believes the matter may not be excluded
under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).
Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Interfaith Coalition on Corporate Responsibility, BRIEFING PAPER FOR BIDEN TRANSITION:
SECURITIES REGULATION AGENCY REVIEW TEAM ON SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL GUIDANCE AND
DECISIONS AT SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 17 (Dec 15, 2020), construed in Letter to
Allison Lee, Acting Chair, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Finance (Jan. 26,
2021)
17,
https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/resources_attachments/chair_lee_letter_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/947S-N2Z9].
279. Id. at 20.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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“[n]umerous past decisions regarding these proposals on investment and
genocide, considering the same proposal model that this proposal had
followed, did not address ordinary business or micromanage and allowed
the proposals to go forward.”282
However, under SLB No. 14L issued in November 2021, the
Division “rescind[ed] Staff Legal Bulletin Nos. 14I, 14J, and 14K (the
“rescinded SLBs”) after a review of staff experience applying the guidance
in them.”283 SLB No. 14L clarified important features of the ordinary
business exception going forward, including:
[S]taff will no longer focus on determining the nexus between a
policy issue and the company, but will instead focus on the social
policy significance of the issue that is the subject of the shareholder
proposal. In making this determination, the staff will consider
whether the proposal raises issues with a broad societal impact, such
that they transcend the ordinary business of the company.284

The SLB clarified that “[u]nder this realigned approach, proposals
that the staff previously viewed as excludable because they did not appear
to raise a policy issue of significance for the company may no longer be
viewed as excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).”285 It also clarified that
“[b]ecause the staff is no longer taking a company-specific approach to
evaluating the significance of a policy issue under Rule14a-8(i)(7), it will
no longer expect a board analysis as described in the rescinded SLBs as
part of demonstrating that the proposal is excludable under the ordinary
business exclusion.”286
SLB No. 14L also recognizes that “the rescinded guidance may have
been taken to mean that any limit on company or board discretion
constitutes micromanagement.”287 SLB No. 14L clarified that
the staff will take a measured approach to evaluating companies’
micromanagement arguments — recognizing that proposals seeking
detail or seeking to promote timeframes or methods do not per se
constitute micromanagement. Instead, we will focus on the level of

282. Id.
283. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14l (CF) (Nov. 3, 2021), https://bit.ly/3gmpmWf
[https://perma.cc/RR4Y-EDRN].
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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granularity sought in the proposal and whether and to what extent it
inappropriately limits discretion of the board or management.288

This clarification is important because the rescinded SLB guidance
may have complicated the future use of the UNGPs and human rights
benchmarks in shareholder requests. For example, rescinded SLB No. 14K
stated that a proposal that “prescribes specific timeframes or methods for
implementing
complex
policies . . . may
run
afoul
of
micromanagement.”289 But many shareholder proposals addressing human
rights reference the UNGPs and its particular approach to integrating
human rights into business practices, including by adopting policy
commitments, due diligence processes, and remediation efforts.290 The
UNGPs also set out particular requirements for each of these
components.291 For example, UNGP 17 states that the due diligence
process should “include assessing actual and potential human rights
impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and
communicating how impacts are addressed.”292 Shareholders have relied
on similar or identical language in their requests to companies regarding
the latter’s human rights practices.293 The advantage of UNGP 17 and its
accompanying principles is that it provides detailed guidance to
companies on protection of human rights but its very specificity may now
impede the ability of shareholders to invoke it in proposals because of the
concern with micromanagement.294 SLB No. 14L recognized that
many of the proposals addressed in the rescinded SLBs requested
companies adopt timeframes or targets to address climate change that
the staff concurred were excludable on micromanagement
grounds. . . . Going forward we would not concur in the exclusion of
similar proposals that suggest targets or timelines so long as the

288. Id. (“We would expect the level of detail included in a shareholder proposal to be consistent
with that needed to enable investors to assess an issuer’s impacts, progress towards goals, risks or
other strategic matters appropriate for shareholder input.”).
289. Shareholder Proposals: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14k (CF), U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Oct.
16,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14k-shareholder-proposals
[https://perma.cc/X6GE-9XD9].
290. UNGP 15.
291. See, e.g., UNGP 15–24
292. UNGP 17
293. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Dec. 23,
2020), https://sec.report/Document/0000100493-20-000207/ [https://perma.cc/FN3L-PSK6]
294. SLB 14K also cautioned that “if a supporting statement modifies or re-focuses the intent of
the resolved clause, or effectively requires some action in order to achieve the proposal’s central
purpose as set forth in the resolved clause, we take that into account in determining whether the
proposal seeks to micromanage the company.” Shareholder Proposals: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14k
(CF), supra note 283.
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proposals afford discretion to management as to how to achieve such
goals.295

Another issue is the threshold requirements for re-submitting a
proposal. In 2020, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 14a-8 that
changed the thresholds for re-submission of shareholder proposals by
“revising the levels of shareholder support a proposal must receive to be
eligible for resubmission at the same company’s future shareholder
meetings from 3%, 6% and 10% for matters previously voted on once,
twice or three or more times in the last five years, respectively, with
thresholds of 5%, 15% and 25%, respectively.”296 As Glass Lewis noted,
“[human rights] shareholder proposals have received very low shareholder
support,”297 noting that, in 2018, the highest support was 19.9% and “of
the eight other human rights-related proposals submitted to a vote in 2018,
only two received over 10% shareholder support.”298 The situation
improved in 2019-2020 with human rights proposals securing average
support between 24%-28%.299 These thresholds may not prove
problematic if human rights proposals continue to win support consistent
with the past few years; however, if average support declines to their pre2019 levels, then many human rights proposals will be excluded from resubmission.300
Finally, in 2020, the SEC also adopted amendments to the eligibility
criteria that a shareholder must satisfy, incorporating a tiered system “that
will require a shareholder to demonstrate continuous ownership of at least:
$2,000 of the company’s securities for at least three years; $15,000 of the
company’s securities for at least two years; or $25,000 of the company’s
295. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14l (CF) (Nov. 3, 2021), https://bit.ly/3gmpmWf
[https://perma.cc/9LBE-2KHD].
296. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Amendments to
Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2020-220 [https://perma.cc/377D-B4AQ]. “The final amendments “will apply to any proposal
submitted for an annual or special meeting to be held on or after January 1, 2022. The final rules also
provide for a transition period with respect to the ownership thresholds that will allow shareholders
meeting specified conditions to rely on the $2,000/one-year ownership threshold for proposals
submitted for an annual or special meeting to be held prior to January 1, 2023.” Id.
297. 2020 PROXY SEASON REVIEW, GLASS Lewis 32.
298. Id.; see also Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 224 (2018)
(finding low levels of shareholder support in 2014 for proposals addressing human rights risk
assessments).
299. 2020 PROXY SEASON REVIEW, supra note 297, at 32.
300. See Jackie Cook & Lauren Solberg, Hints of Sea Change in Big Fund Company ESG Proxy
Votes, MORNINGSTAR (May 12, 2021), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1039244/hints-of-seachange-in-big-fund-company-esg-proxy-votes [https://perma.cc/8VEZ-2RSC] (“However, under new
SEC rules on shareholder resolutions, . . . this could be the last we hear from shareholders on these
issues—a stake held by the Tyson family gives it 70% of the vote at Tyson Foods and a stake held by
JBS (Pilgrim’s Pride) gives the parent 80% of the vote—preventing overall support from reaching the
critical threshold of 25% for a third-time repeat vote.”).
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securities for at least one year.”301 It also “prohibit[s] the aggregation of
holdings for purposes of satisfying the amended ownership thresholds.”302
D. Withdrawn Shareholder Proposals
Some shareholder proposals do not proceed to a vote because their
proponent withdraws them. One reason that a proponent may withdraw a
proposal is because management has agreed to make one or more changes
that the proponent desires and thereby settles the proposal. These
settlement negotiations occur prior to the publication of the proxy
statement.303 “If the parties reach an agreement to settle the proposal, it is
memorialized in writing, and may be as formal as a contract signed by both
parties or as informal as an exchange of emails.”304
Between 2019–2021, a number of IASJ’s members withdrew
proposals at companies such as Bank of America, Nucor, Pfizer, BristolMyers Squibb Company, SunTrust Banks, IBM, and Emerson for
commitments or agreements.305 For example, shareholders withdrew the
proposal at Kraft Heinz when the company “committed to conducting a
HRIA consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (UNGPs).”306 Shareholders had filed proposals at these companies
on a range of issues, including drug pricing, human rights policy,
greenhouse gas targets, lobbying expenditures, and board committee on
human rights.307
The Sisters of the Good Shepherd and the Congregation of Holy
Cross (Moreau Province) withdrew their 2020 shareholder proposal at
Nucor, the largest steel producer in the United States. The proposal had
requested that the “Board of Directors adopt a comprehensive Human
Rights Policy stating the company’s commitment to respect human rights
throughout its operations and value chain, and describing steps to identify,
assess, prevent, mitigate, and, where appropriate, remedy adverse human
rights impacts connected to the business.”308 The proposal noted that
“Nucor does not have a human rights policy. Nucor has a Supplier Code
of Conduct, but it does not include a commitment to respect human rights
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Haan, supra note 204, at 280.
304. Id.
305. IASJ Shareholder Proposals: 2022 Proxy Season, INV. ADVOC. FOR SOC. JUST. Corporate
https://iasj.org/resolutions [https://perma.cc/5NTY-6TXK].
306. Wokaty, supra note 201.
307. IASJ Shareholder Proposals, supra note 305.
308. INVESTOR ADVOCATES FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, NUCOR 2020 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
https://iasj.org/wp-content/uploads/Nucor-2020-Adopt-Human-Rights-Policy-Resolution-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RTD-VFGQ] [hereinafter NUCOR 2020 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL].
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and the Code’s reference to child labor does not align with the ILO
Minimum Age Convention.”309 Additionally, “[w]hile Nucor does have a
Forced Labor Policy, it is limited in applicability to pig iron sourced from
Brazil, which may contain charcoal produced under conditions of forced
labor.”310
While it may not have had a human rights policy when the proposal
was presented, Nucor now has a human rights policy that is available on
its website.311 This policy references both the UNGPs and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and “complements and brings together the
human rights aspects from other Nucor policies and guidelines.”312 Among
other commitments, this policy clarifies that “Nucor has no tolerance for
any form of forced labor, involuntary labor, child labor, human trafficking
or modern slavery in its operations and/or through its supply chain”313 and
that “[i]n any areas of heightened risk, Nucor engages with its contractors,
subcontractors[,] and suppliers to perform diligence[] and to certify and
audit supply chains to avoid directly or indirectly benefiting from or
promoting any such forced labor, child labor, human trafficking, or other
related activities.”314
The shareholders faulted Nucor for the narrow scope of its forced
labor policy that was focused on pig iron sourced from Brazil “which may
contain charcoal produced under conditions of forced labor.”315 But that
scope may be due to Nucor’s prior history—and agreement—with another
shareholder: Domini Social Investments.316 At the time, Nucor was the
largest buyer of Brazilian pig iron and media coverage had exposed the
human rights violations involved with the production of charcoal, an
ingredient of pig iron.317 Domini had submitted shareholder proposals each
year between 2008-2010, requesting board review of human rights in its
supply chain and disclosures regarding the same.318 Domini withdrew its
2008 proposal in exchange for a written agreement with Nucor that
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. NUCOR,
NUCOR
CORPORATION
HUMAN
RIGHTS
POLICY,
https://assets.ctfassets.net/aax1cfbwhqog/1QVrXSK1NzyqxPYgLm8b0M/a20784c40dbe6344d1d63
96018db779e/Nucor_Human_Rights_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3N5-C9KX].
312. Id. at 1.
313. Id. at 3.
314. Id.
315. NUCOR 2020 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL, supra note 308.
316. Domini Reaches Agreement with Nucor on Slavery in Brazil, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Aug.
13, 2010), http://www.ilo.int/global/topics/forced-labour/news/WCMS_143438/lang—en/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/2B2P-HPUK].
317. Id.
318. ADAM KANZER, FIGHTING SLAVERY IN BRAZIL: STRENGTHENING LOCAL SOLUTIONS 67
(2011), https://www.domini.com/uploads/legacy/fighting_slavery_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/852NWM9N].
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“produced a formal policy prohibiting forced labor in its supply chain.”319
But the investors re-filed their proposal because they “were dissatisfied
with Nucor’s compliance with the remaining terms of the withdrawal
agreement.”320 This second proposal received 27% vote.321
In 2010, Domini again withdrew its third shareholder proposal in
exchange for entering into a written agreement with Nucor.322 As part of
the discussions between the two, “Nucor will require its top-tier Brazilian
pig-iron suppliers to either join the Citizens Charcoal Institute (ICC), or
sign and adhere to the National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labor.”323
A supplier’s membership in the ICC is important because “[e]ach ICC
member has agreed to subject its entire supply chain to monitoring to
ensure legal and decent working conditions.”324 Critically, “Nucor has
agreed to publish annual progress reports on implementation of these
policies.”325
According to Domini, “[t]he shareholder proposal was a particularly
important tool.”326 Even when “the investor group did not hold a
significant percentage of Nucor’s shares, the shareholder proposal
provided an important point of leverage, providing access to the
company’s proxy statement and its annual meeting, and providing a means
of communication with Nucor’s largest institutional investors.”327
Domini’s representatives also noted that “[p]erhaps most importantly, the
availability of the shareholder proposal ensures that even small
shareholders can keep critical issues in front of management and the board
of directors year after year.”328 Unfortunately, other shareholders may not
be able to adopt similar strategies following the 2020 amendments to Rule
14a-8 regarding the re-submission thresholds.
The 2020 amendments may impair the ability of shareholders to
reach an agreement with a company. But problems also arise even when
shareholders are able to do so. In studying settlements of campaign finance
disclosure proposals, Sarah Haan identifies particular concerns with
proposal settlements.329 The first concern is the lack of transparency
because “the process plays out completely behind closed doors, with no
notice to or participation by most shareholders, other corporate
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Domini Reaches Agreement with Nucor on Slavery in Brazil, supra note 316.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. KANZER, supra note 318, at 68.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Haan, supra note 204, at 262.
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stakeholders, or the public. The resulting agreements are not publicly filed
and are rarely available to those other than the parties who negotiated
them.”330 This lack of transparency leads to concerns over agency costs 331
and enforcement332 of the agreements that are reached in exchange for the
withdrawal of the shareholder proposal.
Not all of these concerns are necessarily implicated in the settlement
of human rights shareholder proposals. For example, when Nucor failed
to adequately comply with its 2008 settlement agreement, the shareholders
re-submitted their proposal in the following year and received 27%
support.333 If this is indicative of broader practice, then it does appear that
shareholder proponents do care about a company’s compliance with
settlements of human rights proposals. 334 Unfortunately, the 2020 Rule
14a-8 amendments, along with SEC guidance, may constrain the ability of
shareholders to re-file their proposals, thereby undermining the
enforcement of shareholder settlement agreements.335
E. Re-Evaluating “Failed” Proposals: The Information-Forcing Effects
of Company Resistance
Shareholder proposals—even ones that fail—are useful in obtaining
information about company practices that might otherwise prove difficult
for shareholders to obtain. Critically, the shareholder proposal process
may successfully lead to greater disclosure even when the proposal
requesting that disclosure is excluded or fails to gain adequate shareholder
support. This is because the shareholder proposal process may shake loose
information in possession of management that shareholders may not
otherwise possess. To summarize, a shareholder can improve its access to
information by (1) proposing a shareholder proposal for increased
disclosure that is approved and implemented by management; (2) securing
an agreement from management to do the same in exchange for a
withdrawal of the proposal; (3) submitting a proposal in a company’s
proxy statement that invites a detailed statement of opposition from the
board, or (4) submitting a proposal that solicits a “no-action request” from
the company to the Division. These are four distinct channels to obtain
greater disclosure of information. The extent and quality of information is
not the same under all of these mechanisms. The first two routes may
330. Id. at 269.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. KANZER, supra note 318, at 67.
334. Haan, supra note 204, at 323.
335. See also George, Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Media Corporation, supra
note 11, at 343 (noting the multi-year shareholder campaign against Chevron that ultimately resulted
in an acceptable human rights statement).
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secure greater information disclosure that is attentive to the shareholder
proponent’s interests. However, the other two mechanisms can also
improve the aggregate body of information that a shareholder has
concerning particular company practices on a given issue. Put simply: a
company’s act of resistance is information-generating. As a result, even
shareholder proposals that “fail” can prove valuable from an information
gathering perspective.
Consider the third mechanism that concerns the board’s opposition
statements in its proxy statements. When the board opposes a shareholder
proposal, it can recommend that investors vote against it by including a
statement to that effect in its proxy statement. In human rights proposals,
the board often recommends voting against these proposals and justifies
its position by listing all the steps that the company has already taken to
address the same concern. For example, in opposing a 2020 shareholder
proposal concerning human rights due diligence, Kroger’s board
elaborated upon the “several governance assets and compliance
procedure[s]” that it had in place regarding human rights.336 Its statement
referenced not only publicly available documents, such as its human rights
policy, but also included information that it “expect[s] to publish an
expanded statement in 2020, specifically addressing some key topics of
concern like recruitment fees, which can lead to workers becoming
indebted to employers as a result of paying fees for employment.”337 It also
clarified that “Kroger’s social compliance team plans to begin in 2020 a
risk assessment initiative with ELEVATE, Kroger’s primary social
compliance audit company, to better understand social risks in the supply
chain. Results from this process will be used to refine our auditing
approach.”338 Some of this information was publicly available, such as the
policy, but the other information may not have been widely known to the
public.
The fourth mechanism for information disclosure is company noaction requests that rely upon Rule 14a-8(i)(10) for excluding a
shareholder proposal. In these letters, companies outline the various steps
they have already taken to implement the steps that the shareholders have
requested. The review of these letters, and responses by shareholder

336. Kroger Co., 2020 Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 59–61 (May 12, 2020),
https://sec.report/Document/0001140361-20-011379/ [https://perma.cc/6N4J-T2MS].
337. Id.
338. KROGER’S 2019 ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL & GOVERNANCE (ESG) REPORT, KROGER
(2019),
https://www.thekrogerco.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Kroger-2019-ESG-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84V5-TBSJ]; 2020 ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REPORT, KROGER
(2020),
https://www.thekrogerco.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Kroger-2020-ESG-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZSG4-D3G3].
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proponents, are also useful in gaining greater information about a
company’s human rights practices.
We can compare these informal disclosures to the formal disclosures
mandated by various laws. For example, the California Transparency in
Supply Chains Act339 requires covered corporations to disclose efforts on
verification, audits, certifications, internal accountability standards and
procedures, and training regarding forced labor and human trafficking.340
The law requires that covered companies publish this information on their
website if they have one.341 For example, Kroger does not appear to
include information on its risk assessment initiative with ELEVATE in its
statement under the California law,342 but does share this information in
its 2021 human rights statement.343 If Kroger had not disclosed that
information in its statement in 2019-2020, then the management’s
response to the 2020 shareholder proposal shares information that is
otherwise absent from its website and, consequently, accessible to the
public.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores the strengths and weaknesses of shareholder
proposals as mechanisms for encouraging corporate compliance with
international human rights norms. Specifically, it examines how
companies receiving low rankings on human rights benchmarks attract
shareholder proposals requesting that the company provide information on
its policies, implementation and effectiveness of such policies, including
human rights impact assessments, and oversight of human rights issues.
There is reason for both optimism and caution. On the positive side,
this shareholder mechanism provides a way to make international law
norms applicable to non-state actors, such as corporations, thereby
expanding the audience for international law. This mechanism is
particularly important when two conditions are present. First, when
corporations and other businesses are the perpetrators of human rights
violations, directly or indirectly, thus illustrating the need to bring their
conduct into alignment with the international human rights framework.
Second, it is also particularly needed when governments are unwilling or
unable to regulate the human rights practices of corporations – perhaps
339. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, KROGER,
https://www.thekrogerco.com/vendors-suppliers/california-transparency-in-supply-chains-act-of2010 [https://perma.cc/95LE-NLNB].
343. KROGER, STATEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2021), https://www.thekrogerco.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/Kroger-Statement-on-Human-Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRF4-ZLLG].

2021]

Investors as International Law Intermediaries

95

because those governments remain unwilling to sign or ratify a number of
important human rights treaties. Other promising signs include the higher
levels of shareholder support for human rights proposals and the attention
given to these issues by BlackRock and Vanguard, among others, as well
as proxy advisors Glass Lewis and ISS.
But there are also signs that signify caution. While BlackRock and
Vanguard may support human rights proposals, their reasons for doing so
differs from those of the shareholder proponents. This suggests that a
broad base of shareholder support is likely when there is interest
convergence between the proponent, frequently motivated by
humanitarian concerns, and other investors, who rely on the litigation,
reputational, regulatory, and business interruption risks that arise or may
have arisen because of inadequate company attention to human rights.
There is a danger that this support may wane when these risks are absent
or not apparent.
It is also important to recognize the effects of recent SEC guidance
and amendments to Rule 14a-8 that may inhibit the success of this
stakeholder channel for international law. The higher thresholds for
ownership and re-submission may prevent human rights shareholder
proposals in the future; the latter change is particularly problematic when
shareholders rely on consecutive, multi-year engagements to encourage
company management to change their practices. Similarly, a number of
the rescinded SLBs suggested that management may have greater
opportunities to exclude proposals on the basis of “micromanagement.”
This was a problem because the specificity of the proposals allows
shareholders, management, and other stakeholders to overcome the risk of
symbolic human rights compliance. By referencing the specific
requirements of the UNGPs, such as policy development, due diligence
processes, and remediation, shareholders have a common language to (a)
evaluate company performance across firms, (b) identify shortcomings, (c)
formulate recommendations based on international standards, and (d)
measure improvement over the years. It is in these ways that human rights
norms are not merely symbolic. While SLB No. 14L suggests that such
proposals may be permitted, the risk of empty symbolism may re-emerge
if these very attributes serve as the basis for excluding a proposal in the
future.

